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PRIORITY, PROBABILITY, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE:
LESSONS FROM TORT LAW ABOUT IMPOSING ESA
RESPONSIBILITY FOR WILDLIFE HARM ON WATER USERS
AND OTHER JOINT HABITAT MODIFIERS
By
JAMES R. RASBAND*
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater
Oregon, the Supreme Court held that proving unlawful take under
section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires proof that any
challenged habitat modifying activity is the proximate cause of harn to
an endangered or threatened animal. Tus Article applies the rich, but
largely ignored, body of tort law to this proximate cause inquiry and
concludes that the current approach of federal wildlife agencies and
courts to causation of wildlife harm, particularly in cases involving
water users, fails to properly account for background risks, multiple
habitat modifiers, and, in prior appropriation settings, for priority More
specifically, the Article considers whether and how causation of harm
can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence when the
background risk of harm is equal to or greater than the risk imposed by
a particular habitat modification; whether and how causation can be
proven when there are multiple habitat modifiers; and whether and
how causation can take account of priority of appropriation. In
addition, in those instances where there is sufficient proof that harm is
the proximate result of the actions of multiple habitat modiiers, the
Article suggests that the agencies and courts reconsider their current
approach of effectively imposing joint and several responsibility
without any right of contribution and instead move toward the
equitable apportionment approaches that have come to dominate a
reforming tort law. Where instream flow is the habitat issue, allocation
by priority, on balance, seems the wisest course, particularly given the
ESA's explicit commitment to cooperation with states on water
resource issues. In other joint habitat modification situations where
individual contribution to the harm is discernable, responsibility would
0 ©James R. Rasband, 2003. Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. J.D., 1989, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1986, Brigham Young University. I am grateful
to participants in a faculty workshop at BYU and to the participants in Stanford Law School's
Environmental Workshop for their critique and conunents. I thank Joshua Ellis, Daryl Ward,
and Daniel Bower for their research assistance. Conunents can be directed to
Rasbandj@lawgate.byu.edu.
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best be allocated in proportion to those individual contributions.
F)nally, to the extent the agencies and courts are concerned that either
of these two approaches might be too great a burden, they should
consider some good faith obligation to join major habitat modifiers or
some form of contribution action.
I. INTRO DU CTIO N ................................................................................................................ 596
II. CAUSATION UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT ............................... 601
A. Section 9 and Habitat Modification as Prohibited Take ................................ 601
B. The Regulated Community, Concerns with the Harm Regulation .............. 603
C. The Sw eet Hom e D ecision ................................................................................. 605
1. Upholding the Hann Rule from Facial Challenge ................................... 605
2. Sweet Home 's Guidance on Causation and Harm to Individual
A nim als ......................................................................................................... 605
D. Proving Causation and Individual Injurmy After Sweet Home ........................ 609
1. Historic vs. Future Injury ........................................................................... 609
2. The Meaning of "Significantly Impairing Essential Behavioral
P a ttern s ....................................................................................................... 6 10
3. Background Risk, Increased Risk, and Proof of Individual Injury ...... 613
4. The Species Occupation Requirement ..................................................... 617
5. Proving Causation in Cases with Multiple Habitat Modifiers ............... 618
E Causation and Prior Appropriation ................................................................... 620
F Circumventing Causation Problems by Imposing Vicarious Liability ......... 623
III. ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARM AMONG MULTIPLE HABITAT MODIFIERS ..... 630
A. Civil Penalties Under Section 11 ....................................................................... 631
B. Apportionment of Damages in Tort Cases ....................................................... 632
C. Applying Tort LawApportionm ent Principles to Section 11 ' Civil
P enalty Pro vision ................................................................................................. 636
D. Injunctive Relief Under Section 11 and Habitat Conservation Planning.... 637
E Applying Tort Law ApportionmentPrinciples to Section 11 s
Injunctive Relief Provision ................................................................................. 640
IV. POTENTIAL CONCERNS WITH APPLYING PRIORITY STATUS TO QUESTIONS OF
CAUSATION AND APPORTIONMENT .................................................................................. 644
A. Fairness to Junior Appropriators ...................................................................... 645
B. Tfth Am endm ent Implications .......................................................................... 648
V. CAUSATION U NDER SECTION 7 ........................................................................................ 650
V I. C O N CLU SIO N ................................................................................................................... 656
I. INTRODUCTION
The backbone of western water law is the basic notion of first-in-time is
first-in-right. Beginning water law students have long been taught that under
the law of prior appropriation, if there is not enough water in a stream to
satisfy the reasonable uses of all diverters, junior users are obligated to close
their head gates and pray for rain. Such occurrences have been rare because
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historically western states have built so much water storage (read dams)
that short-term drought can be covered for even the most junior diverter.
Although the assertion of priority is rare, it would be hard to imagine a more
fixed principle in water law. It is increasingly evident, however, that this
fixed principle of priority is being ignored when the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)' is used to curtail diversions to assure sufficient instream flow for
threatened and endangered species. Rather than impose the regulatory
burden on junior appropriators, the federal wildlife agencies charged with
enforcing the ESA-the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) within the
Department of Interior and the recently renamed NOAA Fisheries, formerly
and still more commonly called the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS),2 within the Department of Commerce-have exercised discretion
to pursue whichever appropriator they prefer. In several agency
enforcement efforts, senior water rights holders have borne the brunt of
obligations to provide more water.3 Although such efforts have been
relatively infrequent, in part because the ESA has not been vigorously
applied to harms caused by instream flow problems, they are likely to
increase. As of July 2003, some eighty-four fish species had been listed as
threatened or endangered in the nineteen western states.
4
The purpose of this article is to raise questions in advance of this likely
increase about how the ESA should be applied where instream flow deficits
cause harm to threatened or endangered wildlife.' To that end, the article
1 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
2 See NMFS is Now: NOAA Fsheries, 19/20 MMPA BULLETIN 1 (2000) (describing the
reasons for the name change from NMFS to NOAA Fisheries). Despite the name change, this
article will refer to the Service by the acronym NMFS rather than as NOAA Fisheries because
NMFS is the language typically used in the cases, regulations, and literature. NOAA, of course,
is the common acronym for National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
3 See, e.g., David E. Filippi, The Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Water Rights and
Water Use, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-10 to 22-16 (2002) (discussing federal efforts in
the Kiamath, Methow Valley, and Walla Walla River basins to reduce diversions under section 9
and section 7 without respect to the seniority of the state-created water rights).
4 See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES SYSTEM
(TESS)-DETALED SPECIES ADHoc REPORT MODULE, at
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess-public/TESSSpeciesReport?action=form (last visited July 20, 2003)
(allowing search of the number of endangered and threatened fish species in Regions 1, 2, 6,
and 7 which comprise the seventeen western states plus Alaska and Hawaii). Fish, of course,
are not the only species for which watercourses are the critical component of their habitat. See
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. LISTED VERTEBRATE ANIMAL SPECIES REPORT BY TAXONOMIC
GROUP, at http://ecos.fws.gov/servletiTESSWebpage?module=113 (last visited July 20, 2003)
(allowing search of other water-dependent species such as frogs and salamanders, which have
been listed as threatened or endangered).
5 Plainly, lack of water is not the only cause of river harm. Watercourse health is a function
of the quantity and quality of water, both of which are related and impacted by a variety of
factors. The quantity of water in any particular watercourse depends not only upon the extent
of any diversions from the watercourse and any hydrologically connected aquifers but also on
land use which partially dictates the timing and quantities of runoff. The quality of the water is a
function of three basic variables: point and nonpoint source pollution and water quantity
(simply put: the less water the greater the concentration of any particular pollutant). Thus, for
any watercourse whose health is threatened, two broad allocation questions emerge: 1) ivho
will be responsible to insure that more water remains in the watercourse?; and 2) who will be
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reflects upon two basic principles of tort law, namely causation and
allocation of responsibility in cases of harm caused by multiple tortfeasors.
Although the key Supreme Court decision on the enforcement of the ESA-
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon6
(Sweet Home)-requires the wildlife agencies to prove that a person's
habitat modifying activity, such as diverting water, is the proximate cause of
harm to an endangered or threatened animal, the rich body of tort
scholarship, legislation, and case law on causation has largely been ignored
by the agencies and the courts. Similarly, the teaching of tort law has been
disregarded when it comes to deciding how responsibility for harm should
be allocated among multiple habitat modifiers. By overlaying the learning of
tort law on the system of prior appropriation, the legal doctrine of first-in-
time is first-in-right that controls most water allocation in the states west of
the hundredth meridian, this article hopes to illuminate alternative
approaches to allocating responsibility for river harm that would be not only
more equitable but more efficient.7
A simple hypothetical illustrates some of the causation and allocation
issues that arise in cases of river harm. Assume that Smith, Jones, and
Williams are irrigators and the only three diverters along a hypothetical river
which flows entirely within a state applying the prior appropriation doctrine.
The typical total flow of the river is ten cubic-feet per second (cfs). Smith
has a 1900 water right to divert four cfs, Jones a 1930 water right to divert
four cfs, and Williams a 1990 water right to divert one cfs. In a drought year
where the river produces only eight cfs of water, Smith and Jones continue
to divert their full amounts but Williams must cease diverting.
Assume that a particular fish, which has long dwelt'in the river, has
suffered marked population decline since 1990. Fisheries biologists recently
determined that to spawn successfully the fish needs two cfs of water.
Because in a typical year Smith, Jones and Williams divert nine of the
available ten cfs, the fish has not been getting enough water. Now, suppose
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) wants to ensure that the fish will have
the necessary two cfs per year. What happens? Should FWS be treated like
just another aspiring junior appropriator? Some (most likely Smith, Jones,
and Williams) might believe that FWS should be required to get a state water
permit for the last one cfs of river water and then either buy or condenm
responsible for reducing pollution in the watercourse? The focus of this article is on the first
question. In other words, who will be responsible for increased instream flow? Must diverters
and pumpers reduce their withdrawals and, if so, which diverters and pumpers?
6 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
7 More clearly defining the relative security of water tights improves efficiency in two
senses. First, as Ronald Coase suggests, efficient allocation of property is much more likely to
occur when water rights are plainly defined. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 19 (1960). See also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcs 89 (3d ed.
2000) ("[Blargainers are more likely to cooperate when their rights are clear and less likely to
agree when their rights are ambiguous."). Second, when the relative security of water rights is
transparent, senior diverters can make longer-term investments in higher-value uses because
they will have increased confidence in the security of their right. See infra notes 106-08 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of these principles.
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another one cfs from Smith, Jones, or Williams. FWS (and the local
environmental community) will likely take a different view. From their
perspective, all three farmers showed up after the fish, and besides, they
might add, the farmers' water rights were always subject to reasonable
regulation. However firmly the farmers might hold to the view that FWS is
just another appropriator, they (and surely their lawyers) know that FWS is
entitled to regulate to protect the fish. While they may still retain some hope
that the regulation will go "too far," and amount to a compensable taking of
their water rights, they also know that such takings claims are long shots.
But if FWS can regulate to ensure two cfs for the fish, that does not
answer the question of who will have to give up the necessary one cfs of
water. One approach would simply be to pin the blame on the diverter who
caused the harm to the fish. As discussed below, this is in fact an element
that FWS must prove under the ESA. But who was the but-for and proximate
cause of the harm to the fish? Were Smith, Jones, and Williams all joint
causes because but for any one of their diversions, there would be enough
water for the fish? This is the wildlife agencies' current approach to
causation.8 On the other hand, did Williams cause the harm by appropriating
the critical one cfs? After all, before Williams started farming, there was
enough water for the fish and for Smith and Jones. To put this argument
another way, does the background law of prior appropriation matter to the
causation analysis? Recall that in the case of natural drought where the river
produces only eight cfs, Williams would be forced to stop his diversion but
Smith and Jones could continue. Should FWS's demand to leave two cfs in
the river-what some have called a "regulatory drought" because the
regulation rather than nature determines there is not enough water to satisfy
existing uses'-be treated any differently than a natural drought where the
last diverter on a river is the first one off it?
If FWS can overcome the difficulties of proving causation in cases of
multiple diverters with different priorities, how then should responsibility be
allocated among the various diverters? Borrowing from tort law principles,
one approach would be to treat Smith, Jones, and Williams as jointly and
severally liable. In that case, FWS could take the fish's full needs from, say,
Smith alone. This, in essence, is the approach adopted by FWS, although
with a particularly inequitable twist. Whereas in tort law, when joint and
several liability is imposed, a tortfeasor typically has a right of
contribution,'" under the approach to the ESA adopted by FWS, Smith can
bear the entire regulatory burden without any ability to seek contribution
from Jones or Williams. Thus, if joint and several liability is to be the rule of
allocation, a subsidiary question arises with respect to whether there should
8 See Fillipi, supra note 3, at 22-18 to 22-22 (citing cases).
9 In a recent presentation, Professor Brian Gray criticized the metaphor of "regulatory
drought" and its companion "artificial drought." He suggested the term "hybrid drought" is more
accurate because the lack of water is usually a function of both natural and regulatory causes.
Brian E. Gray, Remarks at the 48th Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute (July 26,
2002). Professor Gray's paper was published, without the discussion of hybrid drought, as
Takings and Water Rights, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 23-1 (2002).
10 See irfra Part 11.B (discussing apportionment of tort liability).
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be some right of contribution. Instead of taking any sort of joint and several
liability approach, the three irrigators could also be treated as if they were
proportionately and severally liable. The regulatory need for additional
water could be divided between them according to their relative
contribution to the problem or on a pro rata basis. Yet a third alternative to
apportionment would be to allocate with reference to priority, in which case
Williams would bear the entire responsibility.
As suggested above, the purpose of this Article is to begin considering
the important but largely ignored questions raised by this hypothetical. The
Article begins its inquiry in Part II by considering the vexing questions
surrounding proof of causation under section 9 of the ESA which prohibits
persons from taking endangered species. Specifically, it explores the
meaning and subsequent application of the Supreme Court's decision in
Sweet Home that to violate the take prohibition of section 9, habitat
modification must proximately cause injury to an individual animal.
Although the focus of this Article is on harm caused by lack of stream flow,
Part II of the Article looks at causation more generally. In part, this broader
consideration is necessary because most of the ESA case law involves
habitat modification where the harm is not caused by a lack of water but by
other activities like timber harvesting or land-use development. But this
broader inquiry is not merely foundational; it is also intended to illustrate
how questions about causation might be resolved in other habitat
modification contexts. Part II does, however, focus on the intersection of
causation and prior appropriation and suggests that wildlife agencies and
courts should take account of the priority of water rights in determining
whether a particular diversion is the cause of a prohibited take."
11 The Endangered Species Act is not, of course, the only legal lever for reallocating water
to satisfy public needs. The questions about causation and allocation raised in the article will
have application to other contexts as well. Allocation between multiple diverters has, for
example, arisen as an issue under the public trust doctrine. See infra notes 229-35 and
accompanying text (discussing these public trust doctrine cases). Another area where there are
particular concerns about equitable allocation of responsibility among multiple habitat
modifiers is under the Clean Water Act's TMDL program. Prior to the 1972 Clean Water Act
(CWA), the focus of water pollution control was on establishing water quality standards.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). The idea behind water
quality standards was that state and local governments would decide upon the use they wanted
to make of a particular water body and then regulate the water to assure that it was clean
enough to support that use. This approach was mostly a failure, in large part because it was
difficult to assign fault to any particular polluter for overall river harm. Thus, Congress, in the
CWA, imposed technology-based standards and the NPDES permitting system which were
designed to avoid tracing and allocation problems by imposing clear and enforceable
obligations on individual point source polluters. A vestige of the water quality standards
approach, however, remained in section 303(d). Under that section, states were to submit to
EPA a list identifying so-called Water Quality Limited Segments (WQLS), namely, those waters
that fail to meet applicable water quality standards despite the application of technology
standards. Id § 1313(d)(1)(A). This identification process results in the so-called "303(d) list."
The states were then to prioritize the WQLS according to the severity of their pollution and
proposed use, and then establish total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) of pollutants for those
waters "at a level necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards." Id. §
1313(d)(1)(A), (C). According to EPA's regulations, a TMDL takes into account the natural
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Part III of the Article then turns to the related issue of allocation. It
discusses how allocation of responsibility for harm caused by habitat
modification has thus far been a function of agency discretion rather than a
consistent and principled approach that takes account of multiple
contributions to habitat modification and/or to the priority of harmful water
diversions. Part III suggests that responsibility for civil penalties and
injunctive relief under the ESA could be allocated more equitably in
accordance with relative responsibility and that, in the water context, the
analysis of responsibility should include a diverter's priority status. Part IV
addresses potential concerns with consideration of priority status in
determining causation and allocation in the river environment and, more
broadly, with proportional allocation involving multiple habitat modifiers in
any sort of habitat. Part V then briefly considers how causation and
allocation apply to section 7 of the ESA which obligates federal agencies not
to fund, carry out, or permit any activity likely to jeopardize the existence of
a protected species. This inquiry is necessary because the federal
government is such a major player on the rivers of the West that the federal
wildlife agencies can often ignore section 9 and simply use section 7 to seek
additional water from federal water projects (and thereby from private
parties who divert pursuant to contracts with federal agencies like the
Bureau of Reclamation).
II. CAUSATION UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
A. Section 9 and Habitat Modirication as Prohibited Take
Section 9 of the ESA makes it unlawful for any person, which includes
not only private persons but also federal and state agencies,12 to "take" any
species identified as endangered under the ESA's listing process.13 Although
background loading of a particular pollutant and then allocates responsibility for meeting the
applicable water quality standard among individual point sources (so-called wasteload
allocations) and nonpoint sources (so-called load allocations); it must also include a margin of
safety designed to account for a lack of creditable data, seasonal variations, and expected
growth. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(t) (2002); U.S. EPA, Guidance for Water Quality-Based Decisions;
The TMDL Process 20 (Apr. 1991) (available from the ELR Document Service, ELR Order No.
AD-3550, and at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/decisions). Like the ESA, the CWA does not
give any guidance on how to divide responsibility between point and nonpoint source polluters.
The best review of the law relating to TMDLs is Oliver Houck's five-part series: Oliver A. Houck,
TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water
Act 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,329 (1997); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLS, Are We There Yet?
The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean WaterAct, 27 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,391 (1997); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IIT A New Franework for the Clean
Water Act's Ambient Standards Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,415 (1998); Oliver
A. Houck, TMDLs IV The Final Frontier, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,469 (1999). Oliver
A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V- Aftershock and Prelude, 32 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,385 (2002).
12 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2000) (defining "person").
13 Id § 1538(a)(1)(B) (take prohibition). The listing process is set forth in 16 U.S.C. § 1533
(2000). A species is endangered when it "is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range." Id, § 1532(6). A species is threatened when it "is likely to become an
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the take prohibition of section 9 is limited to endangered species, FWS, by
regulation, has also prohibited take of species listed as threatened14
Because the term take in wildlife law historically most often referred to
hunting, trapping, or otherwise capturing wildlife, one might assume that
section 9's take prohibition would rarely, if ever, implicate water diversions.
But the take prohibition includes more than such traditional activities.
"Take" is defined in the ESA as "to harass, hann, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct. 1 5
Although this definition could still perhaps be read as compatible with the
historical understanding of take,16 the language, particularly the term
"harm," is also subject to a broader interpretation. And by regulation the
federal wildlife agencies have given it a broader interpretation. FWS has
defined harm as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering. " 7 NMFS's regulations are basically
the same but add language more directly related to the fishery which is the
focus of NMFS's endangered species jurisdiction. Habitat modification or
degradation causes harm, according to NMFS, when it "actually kills fish or
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including,
breeding, spawning, rearing migrating feeding or sheltering."18
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its
range." Id. § 1532(20). For an overview of the listing process and the controversy it has
generated, see James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A
Closeup Look from a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 502-20 (1991). See also Oliver A.
Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the US Departments of Interior
and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 280-96 (1993).
14 Under section 4(d) of the ESA, the Secretary "may by regulation prohibit with respect to
any threatened species" those acts which are prohibited with respect to endangered species in
section 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000). Using this authority, the Secretary decided that the take
prohibition of section 9 will apply to all threatened species except in those instances where the
Secretary develops a special 4(d) rule for a particular species. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2002).
Unlike the Secretary of the Interior and FWS, the Secretary of Commerce, through NMFS, has
not adopted such a blanket 4(d) rule. It issues a separate rule for each listed species.
Nevertheless, it has generally applied the take prohibition to threatened species. Robert L.
Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution Control Law
Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
45, 64 (2002). Thus, this article treats section 9's take prohibition as if it is applicable to all listed
species because that is most often the case.
15 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000) (emphasis added).
16 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or. (Sweet Home), 515 U.S. 687,
717-21 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that each word in the take definition can be
understood within the confines of the traditional, historical understanding of "take").
17 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
18 Id § 222.102 (emphasis added). NMFS's list of activities that may constitute take gives
some indication of the potential breadth of the harm regulation in the river environment:
1. Constructing or maintaining barriers that eliminate or impede a listed species' access
to habitat or ability to migrate;
2. Discharging pollutants... into a listed species' habitat...
5. Removing water or otherwise altering streaniflow...
9. Conducting timber harvest, grazing, mining, earth-moving or other operations which
[Vol. 33:595
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B. The Regulated Community's Concerns with the Harm Reguladon
The idea that traditional habitat-modifying activities like home-building,
farming, grazing, and irrigation could be unlawful takes caused significant
angst in the regulated community from the regulation's inception. In part,
this concern was a function of uncertainty about when and what sort of
habitat modification would amount to a prohibited take. In part, it was a
function of the way in which courts began to apply this harm rule. Soon after
the regulation was promulgated, for example, environmental groups filed a
citizen suit under the ESA, accusing the state of Hawaii of taking the
endangered palila finch (Loxioides bailleul) because Hawaii permitted sheep
to graze on mamane-naio tree seedlings (Myoporum sandwicense) that when
fully grown, could have been used by future finches for nesting and
foraging.19 The Ninth Circuit's agreement" that such unforeseen and remote
impacts could be a take had troubling implications for the regulated
community. The FWS harm regulation did not seem to include any limits on
what sort of harm might be considered the proximate result of a habitat
modifying activity. And by prohibiting harm to future members of the finch
population, the regulation included harm not just to particular animals but to
the population as a whole. 21
The concerns of the regulated community came to a head in the early
1990s when the listing of the northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis
caurina), red-cockaded woodpecker (icoides borealis), and marbled
result in substantially increased sediment input into streams.
10. Conducting land-use activities in riparian areas and areas susceptible to mass wasting
and surface erosion, which may disturb soil and increase sediment delivered to streams,
such as logging, grazing, farming, and road construction.
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Definition of "Harm," 64 Fed. Reg. 60,727,
60,730 (Nov. 8, 1999).
19 Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res. (Paila III), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. Haw.
1986), affd, Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res. (Paila IV), 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1988). The district court was confident that this constituted a take: "If the habitat modification
prevents the population from recovering, then this causes injury to the species and should be
actionable under section 9." Id. at 1077. The United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii and the Ninth Circuit each had an opportunity to weigh in during an earlier battle
between environmental groups and the state over Palila habitat. Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land &
Natural Res. (Palia I), 471 F. Supp 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land &
Natural Res. (Pala I), 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). While some refer to both cases from the
1979-1981 litigation simply as Palla I, and to the two cases from the 1986-1988 litigation as
Pala II, this article borrows the shorthand used by the Ninth Circuit in Pal/a IV, and numbers
each case individually. See Paila 1V 852 F.2d at 1107 (describing the history of the various
lawsuits).
20 Pallia I, 852 F.2d at 1107.
21 This in fact was the Palla IIldistrict court's explicit interpretation of the regulation:
A finding of "harm" does not require death to individual members of the species; nor
does it require a finding that habitat degradation is presently driving the species further
toward extinction. Habitat destruction that prevents the recovery of the species by
affecting essential behavioral patterns causes actual injury to the species and effects a
taking under section 9 of the Act.
Palla 11, 649 F. Supp. at 1075.
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murrelet (Brachyramphus marmoratus maxmoratus) brought section 9 to
timber country and FWS began threatening timber harvesters with criminal
prosecution. In one case, "the government alleged that the harvest of less
than one-percent of the home range area of a protected bird almost two
miles from its site center had to be enjoined to prevent a take because the
circle had less than the desired forty-percent cover," which biological
models predicted was necessary for adequate breeding, feeding, and
sheltering.22 In another case, FWS initiated a criminal prosecution against
three Department of Defense employees for "taking [r]ed-[c]ockaded
[w]oodpeckers by conspiring to permit the harvest of [r]ed-[c]ockaded
[w]oodpecker habitat.... No dead woodpeckers were found and the sole
'harm' alleged was permitting cavity trees where woodpeckers might nest to
be harvested, thereby leaving woodpecker colonies in the vicinity without
sufficient habitat in which to forage."23 The common thread in most of the
cases was that harm was equated with habitat modification that either
increased risk for identified birds or for birds that biological models
predicted would likely use the habitat. From the timber community's
perspective, this focus was all wrong. As far as they were concerned, take
should never have been extended beyond its historical meaning, and if
habitat modification had to be the standard, at least FWS ought to prove that
the habitat modification had actually killed or injured some identifiable
animal.
This opposition eventually prompted a challenge to the entire harm
regulation. Led by the forest products industry, a group of property owners
styled as the Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon
argued that FWS had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the
broad definition of harm (NMFS's harm regulation was not challenged
because it was only adopted in December 1999).24 "Take," the plaintiffs
contended, was limited to direct applications of force and did not include
habitat modification that might indirectly kill or injure wildlife. Their
challenge made its way to the Supreme Court in 1995 in SweetHome.25
22 Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private Landowners,
24 ENVTL. L. 419, 421-22 n.5 (1994); see id. at 426-27 (describing FWS guidelines which
"effectively prohibit any harvesting activity within a circle centered on a nest site, or center of
activity with a radius between 1.2 to 2.2 miles, depending on the location"); see id. at 436-38
(recounting how Anderson-Middleton Logging Company was threatened with prosecution when
it proposed to harvest 72 acres of its old growth timber because a pair of spotted owls were
nesting on federal lands almost two miles distant).
23 Id at 422 n.7.
24 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Definition of "Harm," 64 Fed. Reg. 60,727
(Nov. 8, 1999) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 222.102).
25 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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C The Sweet Home Decision
1. Upholding the Harm Rule from Facial Challenge
The Supreme Court, by a six to three vote, rejected the property
owners' argument and upheld FWS's "harm" regulation.26 Its holding was
clear that habitat modification, which causes harm either directly or
indirectly, could be a take. Given that the case involved a facial challenge to
the regulation, this result was not particularly surprising. The Secretary only
needed to point to one legitimate application of the harm rule to prevail. And
it was hard for the court to imagine that habitat modification like draining an
entire pond27 was not just as harmful to a protected fish as finding itself on a
fisherman's hook or in his net.
Because the facial challenge allowed the Court to focus on the easy
case, it did not need to address more perplexing causation and allocation
questions. Causation is clear when one farmer drains the entire pond, but
what about when the farmer merely reduces the available water and
increases the likelihood, as a matter of conservation biology, that a
protected species would be killed or injured. Prior to Sweet Home, FWS had
found harm in such increased risk cases. Could it still do so after Sweet
Home? Moreover, even if causation was clear in the case of the individual
farmer, what about in cases of multiple diverters or habitat modifiers? If a
fish turns up dead, was it caused by one diverter, all the diverters, or natural
causes? And if multiple causes exist, who bears the burden of remedying the
problem? Unfortunately, although appropriate given the procedural posture
of the case, the Court gave only limited guidance on the causation question
and no guidance at all on the allocation question. In the following section,
the article explores what little the Sweet Home Court did say about
causation and how subsequent decisions have built upon that slim
foundation.
2. Sweet Home 's Guidance on Causation and Harm to Individual Animals
For its regulation to pass muster under a facial challenge, FWS did not
need to defend its more aggressive application of the harm rule. It needed
only to find a legitimate application of the harm rule which, as discussed
above, was not particularly difficult. Nevertheless, in responding to
plaintiffs' briefing and Justice Scalia's dissent, the majority felt the need to
assure habitat modifiers that there were limits to the scope of the harm rule.
In footnote 13, the Court stated:
The dissent incorrectly asserts that the Secretary's regulation (1) "dispenses
with the foreseeability of harm" and (2) "fail[s] to require injury to particular
animals." As to the first assertion, the regulation merely implements the statute,
26 Id. at 688, 708.
27 See id. at 699-700 (using the example of a drained pond to point out the flaws in the
challengers' argument).
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and it is therefore subject to the statute's "knowingly violates" language, see 16
U.S.C. §§ 1540(a)(1), (b)(1), and ordinary requirements of proximate causation
and foreseeability. Nothing in the regulation purports to weaken those
requirements. . . .As to the dissent's second assertion, every term in the
regulation's definition of "harm" is subservient to the phrase "an act which
actually kills or injures wildlife."28
Footnote 13 indicated that before habitat modification could be a take, FWS
must prove that the actions of the allegedly taking party were (or, in the case
of injunctive relief, will be) the proximate cause of death or injury to
particular animals. The plaintiffs viewed this emphasis as a significant
victory,29 but left unresolved was exactly what the Court meant by
"proximate cause" and "injury to particular animals."
As suggested by its reference to the "ordinary requirements of
proximate causation and foreseeability," the Sweet Home majority did not
see a need to elaborate on a principle that is applied hundreds of times a day
in run-of-the-mill torts cases. 0 But if courts decide on proximate cause
issues everyday, that does not mean they decide them the same way
everyday. The element of proximate cause is notoriously malleable.31
Definitions and verbal formulae abound. In some cases, the focus is on
foreseeability, as it seems to be for the Sweet Home majority. In others, the
test is directness. In many cases it is both.32 Such verbal formulas leave
ample discretion for determining whether an action will be considered the
proximate cause of harm. As Judge Andrews famously remarked in Palsgraf
28 Id at 700 n.13 (modification in original) (internal citations omitted). See also id at 699
(noting that there are "strong arguments that activities that cause minimal or unforeseeable
harm will not violate the [ESA] as construed in the 'harm' regulation"); id. at 697 n.9 ("We do not
agree with the dissent that the regulation covers results that are not 'even foreseeable... no
matter how long the chain of causality between modification and injury.' Respondents have
suggested no reason why either the 'knowingly violates' or the 'otherwise violates' provision of
the statute-or the 'harm' regulation itself-should not be read to incorporate ordinary
requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability.") (internal citations omitted).
29 See Steven P. Quarles et al., Sweet Home and the Narrowing of Wildlife "Take" Under
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 (1996)
(arguing that Sweet Homds focus on proximate cause and particular animals narrowed the
range of cases in which habitat modification will be a take).
30 515 U.S. at 700 n.13 (emphasis added).
31 "There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion." W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984).
32 As Judge Andrews observed in his Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. dissent, to
determine proximate cause a
court must ask itself whether there was a natural and continuous sequence between
cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in producing the other? Was there a
direct connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of
cause on result not too attenuated? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind
to produce the result? Or, by the exercise of prudent foresight, could the result be
foreseen? Is the result too remote from the cause, and here we consider remoteness in
time and space.
Pasgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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v. Long Island Railroad Co. (Palsgraf):' "What we do mean by the word
'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of public policy, or a rough
sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events
beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics."34
The Sweet Home majority recognized the ambiguities of proximate
cause analysis, observing that "all persons who must comply with the law
will confront difficult questions of proximity and degree."35 Although the
Court's refusal to wade into specifics was certainly appropriate given the
facial nature of plaintiffs' challenge, one can understand habitat modifiers'
continuing concern over the ambiguities of proximate cause analysis when
the ESA imposes not only civil, but criminal, sanctions for take.
3 6
While the majority's elaboration of limits to the harm rule was sparse,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence offered more detail on what proximate
causation could mean for section 9. She stated:
The task of determining whether proximate causation exists in the limitless
fact patterns sure to arise is best left to lower courts. But I note, at the least,
that proximate cause principles inject a foreseeability element into the statute,
and hence, the regulation, that would appear to alleviate some of the problems
noted by the dissent. See, e.g., post at 719 (describing "a farmer who tills his
field and causes erosion that makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes
oxygen and thereby [injures] protected fish").
In my view, then, the "harm" regulation applies where significant habitat
modification, by impairing essential behaviors, proximately (foreseeably)
causes actual death or injury to identifiable animals that are protected under
the Endangered Species Act. Pursuant to my interpretation, Palila [I]-under
which the Court of Appeals held that a state agency committed a "taking" by
permitting mouflon sheep to eat manane-naio seedlings that, when full grown,
might have fed and sheltered endangered palla-was wrongly decided
according to the regulation's own terms. Destruction of the seedlings did not
proximately cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds; it merely
prevented the regeneration of forest land not currently sustaining actual
birds.
37
Although she did not give much more content to proximate cause, Justice
O'Connor did set a marker by specifically disavowing the second round of
the Pala litigation, which had been a source of concern for the regulated
community. Unfortunately, because the majority did not comment on
33 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)
34 Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
35 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708.
36 A person who knowingly violates the take prohibition faces a civil penalty of up to
$25,000 and a criminal fine of up to $50,000 and imprisonment for up to one year. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(a) (2000) (providing civil penalties); id § 1540(b) (providing criminal violations).
Moreover, enforcement of section 9 is not wholly within the discretion of the Secretary. Citizens
may sue to enjoin any person from engaging in an activity which may result in a take and to
compel the Secretary to enforce the take prohibition. See id § 1540(g).
37 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 713-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (first modification in original).
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Justice O'Connor's proximate cause hypotheticals, it is difficult to discern
whether they agreed.'
Intertwined with the issue of proximate causation is whether the
habitat modification must cause harm to a population or to an individual
animal. To return to Justice O'Connor's hypothetical, even setting aside the
issue of remoteness and foreseeability that is her focus, does it kill or injure
a salmon to cover the gravel where it spawns with silt? On the one hand, the
individual health of the spawning salmon is unaffected by the silt. Indeed,
the salmon will soon die in any event. However, if the gravel is covered, the
salmon's eggs will suffocate. According to NMFS' harm regulation,39 causing
siltation is harm because it "significantly impair[s] essential behavioral
patterns, including.., spawning."4' Justice Scalia in his Sweet Home dissent
argued that this sort of harm is harm to the population of fish and not any
individual.4 However, Justice O'Connor, and presumably the majority, were
willing to recognize this sort of interference with spawning as harm to the
individual fish, provided the foreseeability hurdle could be overcome: "One
need not subscribe to theories of 'psychic harm,' to recognize that to make it
impossible for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most essential physical
functions and to render that animal, and its genetic material, biologically
obsolete. This, in my view, is actual injury."42
Although Justice O'Connor was willing to recognize interference with
spawning, breeding, feeding, or sheltering as harm to individual animals, she
did not mean that any harm would do. To the contrary, the only examples of
habitat modification that she recognized as causing harm were those that
"completely prevent[ed]" or made "impossible" breeding.43 For Justice
38 Its silence has been the source of some continuing confusion about whether the majority
(by Justice Stevens) intended to limit take claims to cases of death or injury of individual
animals or whether it meant to include injuries at a population level. Recall that at the end of
footnote 13 the Court remarks that "every term in the regulation's definition of 'harm' is
subservient to the phrase 'an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.'" Id. at 700 n. 13 (internal
citations omitted). The regulation's use of the tern "wildlife" creates ambiguity because
seemingly it can refer to either the species as a whole or to an individual member of the species.
Under this view, the Court can be read as saying that population-level harm is sufficient to
constitute a take. But this reading of footnote 13, and the harm regulation itself, is unpersuasive.
If the term "wildlife" is understood as a reference to the species as a whole, it would not have
made sense to refer to a single "act" which "kills" the species. Single acts almost always kill
animals, not species or populations. Moreover, the Court offered the statement as an answer to
the dissent's criticism that the rule "failed to require injury to particular animals." It would have
been disingenuous for the Court to suggest that the "actually kills or injures wildlife" language
satisfied the dissent's concern if the Court really intended to recognize population-level harm.
Particularly when the straightforward answer is more logical, there is no reason to assume such
disingenuousness on the part of the Court. Finally, elsewhere in the opinion, the Court noted
that "the Government cannot enforce the section 9 prohibition until an animal has actually been
killed or injured." Id at 703.
39 The NMFS regulation is relevant because salmon are within NMFS jurisdiction as
anadromous fish that spend most of their life in the sea.
40 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2002).
41 SweetHome, 515 U.S. at 719-20.
42 Id. at 710 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
43 Id
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O'Connor, merely making spawning more difficult (i.e. increasing the risk
that spawning would not occur), would not be enough. She appeared to
believe that FWS's regulation was only viable if its reference to "significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns,"44 meant that the behavior was
totally prevented rather than merely hindered. In proximate cause terms,
O'Connor's approach suggested that increased risk would not be a
proximate cause of harm to a particular individual because that individual
could beat the odds. Only if the habitat modification made essential
behaviors impossible could one be confident that it would be the cause of
individual injury.
It is difficult to know whether the majority shared Justice O'Connor's
view that habitat modification had to prevent or make impossible breeding,
spawning, feeding, or sheltering before it would constitute injury to
particular animals. It could be that the majority would have emphasized the
word "significantly." They did not say. Exactly how much impairment was
necessary was left to lower courts. Since Sweet Home, they appear to have
been gravitating toward Justice O'Connor's narrow view, but as explained
below, there remains plenty of room for ambiguity and confusion.4"
D. Proving Causation and Individual InuryAfter Sweet Home
1. Historic vs. Future In ury
Prior to the Sweet Home decision, in Forest Conservation Council v.
Rosboro Lumber Co.,46 an environmental group sued to enjoin a lumber
company from logging forty acres of private lands adjacent to a nesting site
of two threatened northern spotted owls. The district court refused to grant
an injunction, concluding the ESA requires historic or current harm to a
protected species. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding an "imminent threat"
that is "reasonably certain" to harm an endangered or threatened species
44 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
45 The confusion over the causation inquiry is not only a function of the Sweet Home
majority's silence but it also flows in part from the traditional problem of distinguishing the
elements of duty and proximate cause. As first year torts students learn, liability decisions can
usually be stated as a matter of duty or proximate causation. This is another of the basic
insights of the Cardozo and Andrews dialogue in the famous Palsgrafcase. There, the issue was
foreseeability, which was alternatively stated as an issue of duty or proximate cause. To
Cardozo, the railroad had a duty to protect its passengers from foreseeable risks and the
allegedly bizarre manner in which Helen Palsgraf was injured was not the sort of accident the
railroad had a duty to prevent. Andrews, on the other hand, assumed that the railroad breached
a duty by knocking the package out of the boarding passenger's arms and then asked whether
that breach of duty was the proximate cause (foreseeable cause) of the harm to Helen Palsgraf.
See generally Palsgraf, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Applications of the harm regulation are no
different. Thus, one court might say that the harm regulation imposes a duty not to make
impossible breeding, feeding, and sheltering; whereas, another court may say that harm is not a
foreseeable result of habitat impairments that do not make such activities impossible. The
conclusion is the same but the emphasized element is different. This article largely looks at the
issue as one of proximate cause, but it should be evident that proximate cause arguments could
be restated in terms of duty and vice-versa.
46 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995).
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constitutes a "taking" under section 9 of the ESA.47 As the Ninth Circuit saw
it, this standard was supported by the overall purpose of the ESA; moreover,
"the injunctive relief authorized by the citizen suit provision is by its very
nature directed at future actions."48 After the Supreme Court's decision in
Sweet Home, a group of defendants in Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt9 argued
that Sweet Home nullified the Ninth Circuit's decision in Rosboro Lumber.
As they saw it, the Court's individual injury requirement obligated FWS to
produce a dead animal (corpus delicti) even in cases of injunctive relief.
There needed to be, they claimed, proof of historic injury to support a
finding of "harm.""° The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and reaffirmed
that "a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm" to an endangered or
threatened species is sufficient to show a violation of section 9.1'
2. The Meaning of "Significantly Impairing Essential Behavioral Patterns"
On one level, Marbled Murrelet seems plainly correct. FWS should not
have to wait until an animal is actually killed or injured before it can seek
injunctive relief. If FWS can prove that it is reasonably certain that a
proposed action will actually kill or injure a particular animal, an injunction
should issue. The more difficult question in Marbled Murrelet, however, was
whether the proposed logging would proximately cause death or injury to a
particular animal. The evidence in Marbled Murrelet showed that within the
area of proposed timber harvest, there had been one hundred detections of
the birds and that in many instances those birds had exhibited "occupied
behavior," although no nests had been found.52 From this evidence, several
experts testified that the proposed harvest would "likely harm marbled
murrelets by impairing their breeding and increasing the likelihood of attack
47 Id
48 Id at 785 (noting that forcing plaintiffs to "wait until after a harm has been inflicted
would render their claims moot before they become ripe" and be contrary to the ESA's purpose
to "halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost") (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
49 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), cer. deniedsub noM. Pac. Lumber Co. v. Marbled Murrelet,
519 U.S. 1108 (1997).
50 Id at 1064.
51 Id This articulation of the standard built on earlier Ninth Circuit case law. See Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1512 (9th Cir. 1994) ("While we do not require
that future harm be shown with certainty before an injunction may issue, we do require that a
future injury be sufficiently likely.") (emphasis in original). A number of courts have adopted
Marbled Murrelet's standard that a "reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected
species" is sufficient to prove harm. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.
1999); Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995)
(including within the definition of "harm" an imminent threat that is reasonably certain to injure
a protected species); Coho Salmon v. Pac. Lumber Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (recognizing that a section 9 violation can occur "when a wholly private action threatens
imndnent harm to a listed species") (internal quotations and citations omitted); House v. United
States Forest Serv., 974 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (noting that "the ESA does not
require that the harm to the endangered species have already occurred").
52 Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1067.
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by predators on the adult murrelets as well as the young."53 These facts
presented the first opportunity to test the meaning of Sweet Home and the
weight of Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Because the harvest would only
impair breeding and increase the chance of predation, the facts appeared
insufficient to satisfy Justice O'Connor's suggestion that the logging
effectively prevent the "detected" birds from breeding or sheltering. In
proximate cause terms, increased risk to a population did not create a
foreseeable risk of harm to any particular individual. In a blow to the
O'Connor position, the Ninth Circuit said that the evidence was sufficient to
meet Sweet Home's requirement of actual injury to particular animals.54
Justice O'Connor's approach, however, made a comeback in two
subsequent district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit. In United States v.
West Coast Forest Resources Ltd,55 the court rejected the United States's
effort to enjoin a timber harvest where the timber to be harvested was part
of the area used for foraging by a spotted owl. Focusing on the word
"essential" in the harm regulation,56 the court held that the United States had
to prove that the area to be harvested was "essential to the owl's survival." 5 7
Interference with foraging was not enough. As long as the owl would still
have other areas to forage, there was no take. West Coast Forest Resources
thus took an approach more akin to that of Justice O'Connor. The habitat
modification must prevent, not just hinder or impair, breeding, feeding or
sheltering.
Another district court in the Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in
Greenpeace Foundation v. Mineta5 s There, the issue was whether NMFS's
operation of a lobster fishery caused a take of the endangered monk seal
which fed on lobsters.59 The court denied Greenpeace's motion for summary
judgment because there was a factual dispute about whether the "lobster
plays such an essential role in the monk seal diet that a reduction of lobster
prey dooms the monk seal to extinction."60 The court later softened the
standard to say that it needed evidence that the lobster comprised "a
significant and essential portion of the monk seal diet.""1 But like the court
53 Id. at 1067-68.
54 Id
55 No. CIV. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 298707 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2000).
56 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002) ("Such [an] act may include significant-habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioralpatterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.") (emphasis added).
57 W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., 2000 WL 298707, at *5.
58 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Haw. 2000).
59 The plaintiffs also alleged that the bottomfish fishery took monk seals because the gear
harmed monk seals and because fisherman at times clubbed or shot monk seals who tried to
take the fish from their lines. Id. at 1135. The court held the evidence that monk seals had been
"killed, hooked, and poisoned in connection with bottomfishing" proved a take. Id. at 1136.
Given the direct, forcible nature of these takes, they fit within any definition of the statutory
tern.
60 Id. at 1134.
61 Id.
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in West Coast Forest Resources, its message was that mere hindrance with
breeding, feeding, or sheltering was not enough.62
This same issue has been playing out in other circuits. In Hawksbill Sea
Turtle v. FEMA,63 plaintiffs sued to enjoin FEMA's construction of temporary
housing in the aftermath of Hurricane Marilyn. 4 They argued that FEMA's
activities would take two protected species of sea turtle by adversely
affecting their "feeding and sheltering patterns by causing increased
discharge of partially treated sewage effluent and sediment runoff into
Vessup Bay."6" Plaintiffs' biologists testified that the runoff would kill
sponges and sea grasses in the Bay which were the primary source of food
for the turtle.66 The court, however, refused the injunction because the
plaintiffs "failed to show that the sponges and sea grasses located in Vessup
Bay are the onlyfood source for the [s]ea [tiurtles or that the [slea [tiurtles
are food limited species."6" Like West Coast Forest Resources and Justice
O'Connor's Sweet Home concurrence, the court's view was that to be a take,
habitat modification must prevent feeding, not just hinder it.' Or again, to
put it in causation terms, proof that an activity will merely hinder breeding,
feeding, sheltering, or spawning is too speculative and remote a basis for
concluding that the activity will proximately cause actual death or injury to a
particular animal.
The First Circuit has long been notable for its rather narrow view of
what constitutes harm. In American Bald Eagle v. Bhatt69 a pre-Sweet
Home case, petitioners sought to enjoin continued deer hunting on a bald
62 Interestingly, in an earlier ruling in the same case, the district judge had concluded that
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their section 9 claim because the case was entirely analogous
to Pabla (discussed supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text). Greenpeace Found. v. Daley,
122 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121 (D. Haw. 2000). The court believed it enough that the lobster played
"an important role" in the monk seal's diet. Id. The court did not cite or discuss Sweet Home or
Justice O'Connor's criticism of Pala Apparently, the court had done more study by the tine of
its second ruling.
63 11 F. Supp. 2d 529 (D.V.I. 1998).
64 Id at 533.
65 Id. at 554.
66 Id
67 Id. (emphasis added). The court observed that the sea turtles might be able to find food
somewhere other than Vessup Bay and that plaintiffs had failed in their burden to prove that
was not possible. Id.
68 The court took a similarly narrow approach with respect to the endangered Virgin Islands
tree boa (Epicrates monensis grantd), which plaintiffs also claimed was threatened by the
construction. Employing reasoning akin to the Ninth Circuit in Arizona Cattle Growers'Ass'n v.
United States Fish and Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2001), discussed infra at notes 85-88 and
accompanying text, the court first rejected an argument that the construction had killed tree
boas because no evidence established that tree boas had been on the site during construction.
Hawksbll Sea Turte, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 552. It then held that testimony from plaintiffs' expert
that boas would later migrate to the site and be harmed by the residents or that the residents'
cats and dogs would venture into the remaining habitat in search of the boas as too speculative.
Id. at 553. Finally, taking away a chunk of the boas' habitat was not enough to prove take, said
the court, because plaintiffs presented "no direct evidence that [t]ree [b]oas have died or been
injured as a result of changes in their feeding and sheltering patterns," or that there was "any
general decline in the population of the [tiree [bloa." Id at 554.
69 9 F.3d 163 (IstCir. 1993).
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eagle (Hahiaeetus leucocephalus) reservation on the grounds that eagles
would be poisoned by ingesting lead shot found in unrecovered deer
carcasses.7' The court held that because petitioners presented no evidence
that any eagles previously had "actually ingested lead slug," that any eagles
ate deer carcasses "containing lead slug," or that any eagles were poisoned
by lead slug,7 they failed in their burden of proving the hunt would cause
"actual harm" to the eagles. 72 In contrast to the expert testimony about
"likely harm" that was sufficient in Marbled Murrelet,73 the First Circuit
emphasized that showing a "significant risk of harm" was not enough.74 The
court chastised the plaintiffs for asking it to "establish that a one in a million
risk of harm is sufficient to trigger the protections of the ESA."7 5 In
proximate causation terms, the court was simply foreshadowing the
approach of Justice O'Connor in Sweet Home: Take cannot be proved by
testimony of unforeseeable or remote harms. The First Circuit has continued
to take this narrow approach post-Sweet Home as well.76
3. Background Risk, Increased Risk, and Proof of Individual Injury
Although the courts appear to be moving in Justice O'Connor's
direction, there remains significant uncertainty about the extent of
behavioral impairment necessary to show harm. The root of the uncertainty
is in discerning when population-level risks determined by conservation
biologists are sufficient to show individual harm. A couple of hypotheticals
help explain why that is the case.
Consider a river system that is degraded by diversions, point and
nonpoint source pollution, and hydroelectric projects. The population of an
endangered fish in the river system has been declining over time as these
various river uses have increased. The best biological evidence indicates that
any individual endangered fish has a five percent chance of surviving to
maturity in the river. Before any human uses of the river, fifty percent of the
fish reached maturity. Plaintiff wants to enjoin a new diversion on the river
and its experts are prepared to testify that the diversion will impair the
70 Id at 164-65.
71 Id. at 167 n.6.
72 Id at 165-67.
73 83 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (1996).
74 An. BaldEagle, 9 F.3d at 167 n.5.
75 Id. at 165.
76 See Strahan v. Linnon, 187 F.3d 623, 1998 WL 1085817, at *4 n.6 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998)
(finding no taking where the risk of a vessel striking a northern right whale (Balaena glacialis)
was a "mere possibility"); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding a "taking"
where the evidence indicated that 11 northern right whales were found entangled in fishing gear
and 57% of "all [n]orthern [right whales have scars indicating prior entanglement"); United
States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D. Mass. 1998) (granting a preliminary
injunction against certain off-road vehicle (ORV) use because of evidence that "a total of 25
piping plover chicks [(Charadrius melodus)] and two adults were found dead in ORV tire ruts").
See generally Alicia M. Griffin, Note, Beyond "Harm": Abandoning the Actual I?/ury Standard
for Certain Prohibited Takings Under the Endangered Species Act by Giving Independent
Meaning to "Harassment, "52 VAND. L. REV. 1831, 1850-52 (1999) (discussing First Circuit cases).
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spawning and feeding of the fish and reduce its chances of survival from five
percent to three percent. If the focus is on individual fish, plaintiff has a
causation problem. Plaintiff will not be able to prove that the project will
harm any particular fish. Think about finding a dead fish after the new
diversion. If there is no rusty hook, no cuts from turbines or the like, plaintiff
would not be able to prove that the fish died because of the human-induced
problems in the river. Given that fifty percent of the fish did not reach
maturity in a state of nature, plaintiff cannot show on a more probable than
not basis that the fish was killed by the collective impact of the various
habitat modifications. The proof is even more difficult if the question is the
new diversion. With respect to any particular fish, the chances of the
diversion harming that fish are only two percent.
If the focus is on population, however, the entire analysis changes. A
biologist may not know which fish will die but she can have a relatively high
degree of confidence (enough to satisfy the more probable than not
standard) that two out of every 100 fish will die if the new diversion occurs.
Although the plaintiff can only prove harm at the population level, the fact
remains that two fish suffer individual, if untraceable, deaths. How this case
comes out after Sweet Home is a difficult question. With respect to any
particular fish, the diversion merely impairs its chance at survival. The
diversion does not make its survival impossible. This suggests that Justice
O'Connor may not see harm in such a case. On the other hand, the fact that
two individual, if unidentified, fish will die may satisfy the majority's
requirement of "injury to particular animals,"7" provided that the diversion is
regarded as a significant impairment.
In the river hypothetical where the new diversion affects the entire
habitat of the endangered fish population, it is relatively easy to conclude
that the diversion will lead to two additional deaths. But it will not always be
so easy to use population data to prove individual harm. Take one more
example. Assume that in a forest untrammeled by man, or indeed in a forest
where habitat modification has occurred but was regarded as reasonable
when completed, there is a ten percent likelihood that any spotted owl will
be killed by a predator. Then assume that a particular timber cut would
increase to fifteen percent the likelihood that a pair of spotted owls will be
subject to predation because the pair will then spend more time flying
without canopy protection. If one of these owls ends up killed by a hawk, it
cannot be proved, on a more probable than not basis, that the timber cut
caused the take. More probably than not, the take would have happened
even without the timber harvest. 78
77 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 700 n.13 (1995) (quoting Justice Scalia's dissent).
78 This hypothetical gets at a part of the Sweet Home plaintiffs' objection to FWS's use of
owl circles. Recall that under FWS's guidelines, take was said to occur when a proposed timber
cut reduced below 40% the percentage of remaining forest cover within a certain radius of an
owl nesting site. See Gidari, supra note 22 and accompanying text. Cutting the first 60% of the
timber was unobjectionable but cutting any portion of the remaining 40%, said FWS, would be a
take. Plainly, cutting the first 60% increased the risks to the owl, but not beyond what FWS
considered a biological tipping point. To the extent FWS must prove individual injury, it is hard
to show causation. Upon finding a dead owl, in a simplistic sense, it is more probable than not
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Even with a population focus, causation is difficult. Unlike the river
hypothetical where we assumed the particular diversion impacted the entire
population, in the owl case, the particular timber cut potentially impacts
only two owls. If a population biologist could review 100 timber harvests
associated with fifteen acts of predation, theoretically she could be
confident that five of those deaths were the result of timber harvests. What
she could not do would be associate any one bird kill with any particular
timber harvest. To enjoin the timber harvest would be to make the single
property owner responsible for a population-level risk. This sort of case
should not satisfy either the Sweet Home majority or Justice O'Connor.
There is no way to tell whether any particular owl will be harmed by the
habitat modification at issue. Indeed, this hypothetical illustrates one reason
why Justice O'Connor may have focused on prevention rather than
hindrance. If prevention is the standard, one can be confident that the owl
will suffer a real injury (i.e. not being able to feed, breed, shelter, etc.). On
the other hand, if increased risk or hindrance is the standard, a particular
bird will not necessarily suffer harm. It may be more risky to fly through the
clear cut, but if it does not get eaten, the bird has not suffered any real
injury.
One could perhaps argue that the bird which is subject to greater
predation risk, or the bird that must look harder for a place to build a nest,
suffers some sort of injury. In fact, tort law has begun to struggle with this
very issue: Whether increased risk of harm is itself actionable.79 But if tort
that the individual owl was harmed by removing the first 60/6 of the cover rather than by
removing some portion of the remaining 40%.
79 Traditionally, increased risks of harm were not enough to establish causation. See H.L.A.
HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw lxvii (2d ed. 1985) (describing courts' approach to
causation). This is still generally the approach of courts. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting claim based on increased risk of cancer);
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (same). A few courts, however, have
recognized claims for increased risks of harm. Professor Klein describes how
courts have recognized three categories of pre-manifestation (or "futures") claims during
the past fifteen years. First, a small number of courts permit plaintiffs to maintain direct
actions for'enhanced risk of disease, assigning a value to the increased risk without any
assurance that a plaintiff's disease will manifest. Second, several jurisdictions recognize
claims for medical monitoring, in which plaintiffs seek recovery for the cost of
surveillance to detect the onset of disease. Third, a number of courts allow actions for
fear of disease, in which plaintiffs seek compensation for emotional distress.
Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle of Future Cases in Tor 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
965, 967-69 (2002) (footnotes and citations omitted). See also Christopher H. Schroeder,
Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 469-73 (1990)
(arguing for liability based on increased risk of harm); Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers
Hoffman, Torious Toxic, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 67 (2001) (same). A related
issue arises in what are known as "loss of chance" cases where a defendant's negligence
(typically a misdiagnosis) decreases plaintiffs chance of recovery from a pre-existing illness
and then death or injury actually occurs. In such cases it can be difficult to prove on the
traditional more probable than not basis that defendant's negligence was the cause in fact of the
death because in many cases the greater probability is that the death or injury was the result of
the underlying illness. A federal district court in Crosby v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 924 (D.
Alaska 1999), reported that of the states that had addressed the issue, twenty-two states
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law is only just struggling with this issue, it would be surprising if Congress
intended harm to animals to include these sorts of harms. The only real way
to get at the timber harvester is to employ the population approach to harm
that Sweet Home rejected.
A useful lesson from these two hypotheticals is that population-level
harms are not all alike. In the river example, the biologist could use
population analysis to testify that the specific diversion would take two
unidentified but individual fish; but in the owl example, the biologist could
not tell from the population numbers whether the specific harvest would
take any owls. Thus, even if one is inclined to a broad reading of Sweet
Home's requirement of injury to particular animals, that reading is more
tenable in cases where the habitat modification in question alters the habitat
of the entire population and not just the habitat of a particular animal."0
Finally, it is important to recognize that both of these hypotheticals
involve situations where the risk created by the habitat modification is less
than or equal to the background risk. This, of course, will not always be the
biological case. If the habitat modification more than doubles the
background risk, and if a court employs a population-based approach,
another causation problem arises. Assume, for example, that the timber
harvest would increase the risk of predation to the owl to 50% from the
background 10%. In that case, if a dead owl shows up in the harvested area,
on a pure probability basis, it is more likely than not (80% chance) that the
owl was killed because of the habitat modification. If the timber company is
held liable for the take, it may be held responsible for a take it did not cause
(a 20% chance). Violators of section 9's take prohibition may be assessed a
civil penalty of $25,000 for each violation."1 Thus, if five owls are taken in the
area of the timber cut, and each time liability is assigned based purely on
probability, the timber company could pay $25,000 in civil fines for takes it
did not cause. On the other hand, if the numbers were reversed, the timber
company would avoid liability for the four of five takes it did cause.
recognize the loss of chance theory "to some degree," while twelve have rejected it and three
are undecided. Id at 927-28. See generally David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a
Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001) (advocating recovery in loss of chance cases).
80 Another type of population-level harm is habitat modification that merely retards
recovery of a protected species without necessarily increasing the risk of current population
decline. Although no court before or after Sweet Home has specifically found retarding
recovery to be harm, several have raised the possibility. See, e.g., Paula I, 852 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1988) ("[W]e do not reach the issue of whether harm includes habitat degradation that
merely retards recovery."); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1512-13 (9th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Paula IV); Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. United States Fish and Wildlife, 273
F.3d 1229, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Burlington N. R.R); Bensman v. United States Forest
Serv., 984 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (quoting Paila IV). Such statements are hard to
reconcile with Sweet Home and the prohibitory focus of section 9. Recovery of a species is, by
definition, a population-level concern. It does not actually kill or injure a particular animal.
81 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (2000). The statute also provides for a criminal sanction of up to a
$50,000 fine or one year of imprisonment. Id. § 1540(b). For a general overview of the ESA's
penalty provisions, see MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 227-29 (1997).
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This is precisely the problem faced in mass exposure tort cases. How
can traditional tort causation principles apply to cases where a food or drug
increases the risk of harm over the background amount? To the extent a
court employs a probability approach, it ends up denying recovery to some
deserving plaintiffs or imposing excess liability on defendants. Courts and
commentators have been wrestling with this question in tort cases.82 There
has been no effort to consider the issue in ESA cases.
4. The Species Occupation Requirement
Although there is continuing debate about the extent of impairment
necessary to prove individual injury, the Ninth Circuit has recently led the
way on establishing a minimum evidentiary floor for proof of causation and
individual injury. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal,83 and Arizona Cattle
Growers'Ass'n v. United States Fish and Wildlife (Cattle Growers'),' the
panels held that to prove a take the government must prove that the
protected species occupies the habitat which will be modified. 5 This
standard makes sense. The first step in assuring that the wildlife agencies
prove individual harm is to assure that individual animals are actually in the
habitat to be modified. In Cattle Growers'the court emphasized that it was
not enough to speculate about the "potential" of the endangered razorback
to move upstream into the area to be grazed or about the "potential"
downstream effects of grazing.86 Nor was the court persuaded by general
evidence "that trailing livestock along and across creeks could potentially
step on fish, larvae, and eggs, remove vegetation that could influence water
temperature, or trample stream banks that could lead to changes in stream
morphology."8 The Service was obligated to show what "would occur" in a
specific location.8 8
Until its decision in Cattle Growers', the Ninth Circuit was probably the
jurisdiction quickest to recognize take from habitat modification. Whether
Cattle Growers'represents a real break from past practice will depend on
whether the Ninth Circuit rigorously adheres to the case's species
occupation requirement. Right now, however, it appears that to prove a take
in a case for injunctive relief in the Ninth Circuit, FWS and NMFS must show
that the protected species is physically present in the place where the
contested activity is to occur. If it is not, the connection will be too tenuous
82 See supra note 79 (discussing this issue). See also David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV.
851, 857 (1984) (describing probability approaches in DES mass exposure cases).
83 204 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2000).
84 273 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).
85 More specifically, in Cattle Growers, the court held that FWS acted "in an arbitrary and
capricious manner by issuing Incidental Take Statements imposing terms and conditions on
land-use permits, where there either was no evidence that the endangered species existed on
the land or no evidence that a take would occur if the permit were issued." Id at 1233.
86 Id at 1246.
87 Id at 1247.
88 Id.
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or indirect to show causation. If the species is present, a take finding will
depend upon whether the court understands "significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns" to include only habitat modification that
prevents or makes impossible breeding, feeding, spawning, or sheltering
(like Justice O'Connor and the West Coast Forest Resources court) or to
include modification that merely hinders such behavioral patterns (like the
court in MarbledMurrelet).
Viewed as a whole, the post-Sweet Home case law appears to be taking
a narrower view of when habitat modification will be considered the
proximate cause of harm to a protected species. Although it sounded a bit
optimistic at the time, the Sweet Home plaintiffs' claim that the case was not
a total loss for them despite the upholding of the harm regulation 9 is bearing
some fruit. It appears as though plaintiffs (whether FWS, NMFS, or a citizen)
who seek to prove that habitat modification is or will be the proximate cause
of harm must prove: 1) that the protected species occupies the habitat that
will be modified; and 2) that the habitat modification will: a) cause bodily
death or injury to individual member(s) of the occupying species; ° or b)
prevent or make impossible (or perhaps just significantly hinder, if
subsequent cases have not supplanted Marbled Murrelet) member(s) of the
occupying species ability to feed, spawn, breed, or shelter.9 '
5. Proving Causation in Cases with Multiple Habitat Modifiers
An additional complexity presented by Sweet Home's proximate
causation requirement is how to establish causation in cases where there are
multiple habitat modifiers. This is no small issue. Most harmful habitat
modification is a product of multiple actors. Perhaps the most interesting
case on this issue is Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States Department
of Navy (Pyramid Lake).2 There, the Tribe argued that water diversions by
the Navy harmed the endangered cui-ui fish (Chasnistes cujus) by reducing
the water level in Pyramid Lake. The Ninth Circuit, however, denied the
claim. It reasoned that because the Tribe failed "to distinguish the Navy from
89 See Quarles et al., supra note 29 (arguing that Sweet Home narrowed the range of cases
in which habitat modification will be a take).
90 Although the agencies prefer having a corpus delictti that will not guarantee proof of
causation. There remains the danger of post hoe ergo propter hoc analysis. A good example of
this fallacious logic is plaintiffs argument in Hawksbill Sea Tirtie v. FEMA, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529
(D.V.I. 1998). There, plaintiffs asserted that a construction project was harming the endangered
Virgin Islands tree boa. They presented evidence of habitat modification and evidence of harm:
one dead and one injured tree boa were found near the construction project. Id at 538.
Plaintiffs, however, failed to present evidence linking the habitat modification (the construction
project) to the harm (the dead and injured tree boas). Id. at 554.
91 To state the elements another way, to the extent the species is not present, harm is not
sufficiently foreseeable; and to the extent there is no bodily injury, interference with behaviors
like breeding, feeding, and sheltering will not be considered a proximate cause of harm unless
the interference rises to the level of actually preventing (or significantly hindering) such
activities.
92 898 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
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other users of Truckee River water," one of whom was the Tribe itself, the
Tribe had not proved that the Navy was the cause of the harm to the cui-ui.
9 3
The reasoning of the Pyramid Lake court portended a significant
burden on section 9 plaintiffs. Because most watercourses in the West have
multiple diverters and are often over-appropriated, it would be very difficult
to prove that one diverter was the but-for cause of the lack of instrear flow.
Shut the Navy's head-gate and there would still not be enough water. Or,
from another perspective, shut the other diverters' head-gates and there
would be plenty despite the Navy's diversion. PyTamid Lake, however, has
not had much influence, probably because the court's understanding of
causation departed from the approach applied in tort law. Assume, for
example, Xand Yboth negligently start fires; the fires join and then burn Z's
property. Neither X nor Y is the but-for cause of the harm to Z X can
legitimately claim that Z's property would have burned even if X had not
ever started his fire. And Ycan make the same argument. But this lack of
but-for causation did not deter courts from imposing liability on X and Y
Instead, they simply asked whether the acts of X and Y were "a material
element and a substantial factor" in bringing about the harm.94 Asking
whether the actions of X and Y were "substantial factors" is essentially a
proximate cause question: Was the participation sufficient to warrant
imposing liability?
Under basic principles of tort law, multiple defendants can also be held
liable for separate acts of negligence which combine to cause a single injury
even though none of the negligent acts by themselves would have been
sufficient to cause the harm.95 To illustrate, Xparks his truck in the middle
of the road and Y, driving at night without lights, runs into Xs truck, injuring
his passenger. X and Y are both liable for the harm to the passenger, even
though the passenger would not have been hurt if either Xor Yhad not acted
negligently.96 Xand Yare both but-for causes.
Had these two traditional common law approaches to causation been
applied in Pyramid Lake, the result may have been different. Under the latter
illustration, even though no diversion (including the Navy's) was alone
enough to cause the lack of water, they were all but-for causes (e.g. if any
one of them had stopped diverting there would have been enough for the
cui-ui)9 Under the former illustration, the court could have decided that
93 Id. at 1420. The court indicated that "[tihe evidence does not establish that any one year's
diversions of Project water has actually caused the cui-ui's spawning problems." Id
94 KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 267.
95 Id. at 267-68.
96 See, e.g, Hill v. Edmonds, 270 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1966) (case on which hypothetical is based).
97 An application of this principle arose in United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Distric4
788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992). There, the question was whether the irrigation district's
pumping operations (which at times slurped up 33% of the Sacramento River) were taking the
threatened Chinook winter-run salmon. The evidence indicated that large numbers of fingerling
salmon were killed each year by entrainment on the fish screen installed in front of the
District's intake pumps. Id. at 1130. Those that made it through the fish screen were chewed up
in the pumps. The District argued that its pumping was not the cause of the take. The real
cause, said the District, was the fish screen, which had been installed by the California
Department of Fish & Game to prevent the greater harm caused by the unprotected pumps. The
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even though the harm would still have occurred in the absence of the Navy's
diversion, the Navy's diversion was a substantial factor in the overall lack of
water in the Truckee River. In sum, under traditional principles of causation,
the fact that there may be multiple habitat modifiers does not generally
present a difficult obstacle to proving causation."
E. Causation and Prior Appropnation
If the existence of multiple habitat modifiers does not usually create a
causation problem, it does raise a challenging causation question when the
habitat modifiers are water diverters with different priority rights to the
water. This difference is a fumction of the fact that a diversion has a priority
component that is not present with other forms of habitat modification. For
example, the nature of a logger's property rights in his forest generally do
not depend on the time at which his neighbor, or predecessor, acquired his
right. He cares little when his neighbor acquired his property or which of
them can trace their title back to the earlier homestead patent. But when it
comes to water rights, the nature of the neighbor's water right makes all the
difference. First-in-time is first-in-right. A water right derives its value largely
as a matter of relation. The earlier the priority date of a water right, the more
valuable the water right.
The question of whether the priority component of a water right is
relevant to proving causation can be divided into two parts. First, should a
state law prior appropriation scheme matter to the application of federal
law? And second, if state prior appropriation law matters, how does it
impact the analysis of proximate cause? As to the first question, there is
little reason to ignore state prior appropriation laws in assessing liability
under the ESA. In fact, the ESA specifically declares it "to be the policy of
Congress that Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies
to resolve water resource issues in concert with conservation of endangered
species."99 Likewise, the Act obligates the Secretary in implementing the
ESA to "cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the States.""°
District's argument was particularly audacious because the only reason Fish & Game had
installed the screen is that the District had refused to replace a screen it had installed under a
prior court order. Unsurprisingly, the court rejected the District's causation argument. It first
noted that the pumping was the primary cause, not the fish screens, and then said that at very
least the pumping was a "substantial factor" in the harm to the fish. Id at 1133-34.
98 This is certainly true with respect to multiple habitat modifiers who act at the same time.
However, where past habitat modification has increased the background probability of harm to
a particular species, the difficulty of proving that new habitat modification more probably than
not caused harm to an individual animal will increase. See supra Part II.D.3 (discussing this
causation problem).
99 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2000).
100 Id. § 1535(a). Although a statement of policy and of "practicable" cooperation do not have
real teeth, they do at least indicate that the agencies should disrupt the prior appropriation
system as little as possible or, at very least, may consider prior appropriation in determining
causation. Cf Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (construing
Wallop Amendment, which is a similar provision in the Clean Water Act, as indicating "that
Congress did not want to interfere any more than necessary with state water management").
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Thus, far from precluding consideration of prior appropriation law in
determining causation, the ESA encourages it.
As to the question of whether seniority matters to the proximate cause
analysis, the answer is that in states that apply the prior appropriation
doctrine, a senior water right holder will not typically be the proximate
cause of a lack of instream flow.'0' This conclusion may initially seem
counter-intuitive because the senior will be diverting water at the same time
as junior appropriators. It appears to be a typical joint cause case. What this
analysis ignores, however, is that the senior only acts jointly along the
physical dimension; he does not act jointly along the priority dimension.
Even though the senior and junior divert their water at the same time, it
is really akin to the following hypothetical. Suppose a forest is home to a
spotted owl pair and that the ownership is divided between two private
parties-A and B. Suppose A harvests all of his trees in year one. Because
there is plenty of habitat left for the owl pair, A will not be prosecuted for
take. Assume, however, that the next year B proposes to harvest his trees
and that FWS seeks to enjoin B's logging. If FWS is able to prove that cutting
the rest of the habitat is reasonably certain to cause actual death or injury to
the owl pair, the injunction will likely issue. If B is a cause of injury to the
owls, what about A? In light of the fact that the ESA has not been applied in
cases like this-i.e. where previous habitat modification did not result in
death or injury-the answer is seemingly that A is not considered the
proximate or legal cause of the harm.
Imposing liability on B but not A is a feature of the ESA that has been
criticized for creating a perverse incentive for property owners to modify
habitat as quickly as possible.102 And there is some empirical evidence that
has been the case.0 3 But the imposition of liability on B alone is certainly
101 The word "typically" here is an important one. In the hypothetical river situation
described in the text, diversions are assumed to affect flow for the entire length of the river.
That, of course, is not usually the case. For example, an endangered fish may live only in an
upstream portion of the river. To shut down junior rights below the habitat would bring no
benefits to the fish. This does not mean, however, that priority would be irrelevant to causation.
It simply means that the priority analysis would occur within a smaller reach of the river. It is
possible that a species at the stream's headwaters could be harmed by a headwaters diversion
by the most senior rights holder. But that will not "typically" be the case. To broaden the point,
the basic river hypothetical in the text could be made more complex on a number of levels. The
harm is likely, for example, to be a result not just of diminished flow but increased point and
nonpoint source pollution, hydropower projects, etc. But the basic point remains valid. To the
extent some of the harm is caused by a lack of stream flow, the specific cause of that lack of
stream flow is the junior-most diverter.
102 See generally John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with
Hotspots Legislation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1202-04 (2001) (discussing these "perverse
incentives" and citing other articles making similar points).
103 See generally DEAN LUECK & JEFFREY MICHAEL, PREEMPTIVE HABITAT DESTRUCTION UNDER
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2000),
http://papers.ssrn.consol3/delivery.cfm/00810470.pdf?abstractid=223871 (describing a study
of timber owners in South Carolina who modified their harvesting practices to reduce the
chance of their land becoming habitat for the red-cockaded woodpecker). Lueck and Michael
hypothesized that because red-cockaded woodpeckers preferred old-growth trees for nesting,
landowners may have an incentive to harvest their trees before they grew old enough to attract
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
not extraordinary. Tort law generally does not regard as proximate causes of
harm those acts that were reasonable when completed, even if they are later
but-for causes of harm. For example, when a state builds a highway and an
accident is later caused by a drunk driver, we would not generally think of
the highway as the proximate cause of the accident despite the fact that it is
perfectly foreseeable that some motorists will use the road improperly. °4 As
a general matter, the law encourages productive behavior even where it lays
the foundation for subsequent negligent behavior.
Certainly, a different approach is possible. If, for example, B went
ahead and cut his trees, one could argue that both B and A should be liable
for take. If A had completed his cut only weeks before B, we may feel more
comfortable about treating the two as joint causes than if A had completed
his cut fifteen years prior. But that is the essence of a proximate cause
determination and why it is often called "legal cause." To say that an act is
not the proximate cause of harm is simply to decide for policy reasons not to
extend causation that far. 05 And thus far, it has been the policy of the courts
and agencies not to extend takings liability to habitat modification that was
not harmful when completed. A contrary rule would mire the agencies and
courts in an exceedingly complex historical inquiry and likely discourage
many productive uses of land.
To return to the broader point of the logging hypothetical, although
they divert at the same time, the senior and junior diverters are little
different than A and B, respectively, and to the extent they are different, the
senior diverter should be treated even more favorably than A. In the logging
example, A avoided liability because A cut first. Although perhaps not true in
real-time, logically and legally the senior right is exercised before the junior
right. There is no reason why the senior should not enjoy exactly the same
protection as A. If anything, the senior actually deserves more protection. A
and B held identical property rights, not relational. A only avoided liability
by fortuitously acting before B. The senior's rights, by contrast, are
expressly defined in relation to the junior's rights. Whereas B might
legitimately complain about the inequity of imposing the full protection
obligation on him just because A cut first, a similar complaint from the
junior diverter would be much less persuasive because the very nature of his
water right was defined by its subservient priority status. Thus, in prior
appropriation states where wildlife harm is caused by lack of stream flow, as
woodpeckers. Id. at 6-7. To study the way in which the presence of red-cockaded woodpeckers
influenced logging decisions, Lueck and Michael surveyed over 400 landowners and gathered
data from over 1000 individual forest plots. Id. at 19-20. Their study showed statistically
significant evidence that the closer woodpeckers were to a plot, the more likely it was both that
the trees would be harvested and that the trees would be harvested at an earlier age. Id at
30-35.
104 Of course, as discussed above in supra note 45 and accompanying text, one could follow
Cardozo's Paisgraf admonition and consider the highway case in terms of duty rather than
proximate cause. The state could be said not to have a duty to the injured motorist.
105 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the policy component of
proximate cause).
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a matter of logic and fairness, the junior-most diverter(s) should be treated
as the proximate cause of the harm.
Determining proximate causation with reference to priority would also
promote a more efficient use of water. Junior appropriators have already
considered the risk of water unavailability in their decision to appropriate
and invested accordingly.1"' Thus, to take away their rights may involve less
interference with significant capital investment than might be the case with
a senior appropriator with a seemingly secure water right. It would surely
involve less interference with longstanding, firmly entrenched expectations
of senior appropriators. Allocation by priority also would have the value of
greater certainty and predictability." 7 Rather than guessing at whom the
wildlife agencies would target in a joint cause scenario, appropriators would
be able to calibrate their regulatory risk with reference to their priority. This
certainty, in turn, would also more likely create a climate for market
solutions to watershed problems because the more clearly defined the right,
the more likely markets are to develop.
1 18
The suggestion that considering priority as part of the causation
analysis is more efficient and fairer to senior diverters does not perhaps
sound very much like a causation analysis. Yet, as discussed above, at its
core, proximate cause is not a scientific determination but a policy
conclusion.109 Thus, fairness to a senior right holder does matter. That said,
the priority issue can be stated just as easily in traditional causation
language. The senior diverter can be viewed as completing his habitat
modification before any harm occurs and thus as neither the but-for nor
proximate cause of the harm later caused by a junior user. To use another
formulation, the senior's diversion is too remote from the harm to be its
proximate cause.
Even if one is not inclined to accept this proximate cause argument and
prefers to view all diversions without reference to priority and thus as joint
causes of harm, the fairness issue cannot be avoided. To the extent all
diverters are joint causes of harm, there is still a question about how
responsibility for that harm should be allocated among the diverters. Is it fair
for a senior to bear the entire section 9 responsibility just because he is one
of several joint causes? This separate allocation issue will be discussed in
Part III, below.
F Circumventing Causation Problems by Imposing Vicarious Liability
One final causation issue worthy of note, because of its potential to
avoid many of the difficult proximate cause discussed above, is the budding
106 See Janet K. Goldsmith & Ariel Pierce Calonne, The California Public Trust Doctrine-
UnsettledLaw, UnsettledRights, 4 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 13,16 (1986) (making this point).
107 See id. (making this point).
108 See Coase, supra note 7, at 8, 10, 19 (suggesting that when property rights are clearly
defined, private actors will negotiate for the most efficient use of the property); see also
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 89 (3d ed. 2000) ("[B]argainers are more likely to cooperate
when their rights are clear and less likely to agree when their rights are ambiguous.").
109 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing this issue).
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case law imposing vicarious liability on state and local governments for
species-harming activities of private parties. Under the ESA, persons, which
include federal, state, and local governments,I" are prohibited not only from
taking protected species but also may not "cause [a taking] to be
committed.""' Relying on these prohibitions, courts have imposed vicarious
liability on federal agencies and on state and local governments."' From his
analysis of those cases, Professor Ruhl derived three theories of vicarious
liability. 113
The first category of cases consists of those where the government is
the owner or operator of the land on which the private activities cause a
take. 114 For example, in Sierra Club v. Yeutter,"5 the court held the Forest
Service responsible for private timber harvesting conducted pursuant to the
agency's timber management plan where the logging impaired the breeding,
feeding, and sheltering practices of the endangered red-cockaded
woodpecker. 6 In a similar case, the town of Plymouth was held liable for
issuing some 2000 annual permits to ORV users because the permit holders'
riding on the town beach harmed the endangered piping plover (Charadrius
melodus).117 Professor Ruhl argues that these cases fall squarely within the
ambit of the statutory language11 and he is probably correct. Where the
government acts as a proprietor, there is no reason that it should be treated
110 16 u.s.c. § 1532(13) (2000) (defining person to include "any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State").
111 Id. § 1538(g).
112 The vicarious liability theory was first employed in a pre-Sweet Home case, National
Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,891 (E.D. Cal. 1985), where the
district court held that FWS violated section 9 by allowing hunters to use lead shot despite
significant evidence of death and injury to threatened bald eagles as a result of lead poisoning.
Id. at 20,893. The theory gained a further foothold in Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294
(8th Cir. 1989) which involved a suit against EPA, alleging that its registration of strychnine, an
active ingredient in many pesticides, was taking various protected species. The Eighth Circuit
rejected EPA's argument that it was the misuse of strychnine by private parties, and not its
registration by EPA, that caused the harm and thus enjoined EPA from registering the
strychnine within range of a list of endangered species. Id at 1301.
113 See J.B. Ruhl, State and Local Government Vicarious Liability under the ESA, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 70, 73-76 (2001).
114 Id. at 73.
115 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
116 Id at 439. Following Yeutter, vicarious liability issues continued to appear in suits against
other federal defendants. See House v. United States Forest Serv., 974 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ky.
1997) (granting an injunction against U.S. Forest Service to prohibit the sale of timber because
its removal by private parties would take the endangered Indiana bat (Myotis sodalis)); Strahan
v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding no violation of section 9 in suit against
Coast Guard for the non-discretionary issuance of certificates of documentation to private
vessels that caused takings of protected species); Ctr. for Marine Conservation v. Brown, 917 F.
Supp. 1128 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding no violation of section 9 where federal defendant's
permitting of shrimping by private parties caused "takings" of the protected sea turtle in excess
of their incidental take statements); Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353
(W.D. Tex. 1993) (finding that FWS violated section 9 by failing to develop minimum spring
flows below which diversions of private and state parties would "take" the endangered fountain
darter (Etheostoma fonticola)).
117 United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998).
118 Ruhl, supra note 113, at 73.
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any differently than a private property owner who cannot avoid section 9 by
contracting out harmful habitat modification to another. In proximate cause
parlance, the private activities are classic dependent intervening causes-
they could not occur absent government permission because the activities
are on government land. Typically, an intervening cause that depends on a
prior act to trigger its operation will not be considered the sort of
superseding cause that terminates a chain of causation." 9
A second category of vicarious liability cases consists of those where
the state or local government issues permits or licenses with respect to an
activity that causes a take. 2 ° In Strahan v. Coxe (Strahan),'2' the First
Circuit held that the Massachusetts Department of Fisheries' authorization
of gillnet and lobster gear use by commercial fishing boats caused a take
because endangered northern right whales (Balaena glacialis) became
entangled in the gillnets and lobster gear.122 The state argued that the
licenses were not the proximate cause of harm to the whales because the
harm was indirect, in other words, that the fishermen were an intervening
and superseding cause. 123 The court, however, rejected the argument, noting
that section 9 encompassed indirectly caused harm. 124
As Professor Ruhl has explained, there are several persuasive reasons
why imposing liability in cases like Strahan is contrary to the statutory
scheme of the ESA. 125 But Strahan is dubious not just as a matter of
congressional intent but as a matter of causation. The court's causation
reasoning depends upon a critical but unexplored premise-that the permit
is what authorized gill-netting and lobstering in the first instance. If one
accepts that premise, the court's reasoning seems correct: the state is the
cause of the problem because it initiated the harm-causing activity. That the
119 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 301-02; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440
(1965).
120 Ruhl, supra note 113, at 73.
121 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
122 Id. at 163.
123 Id. As the state saw it, the state's licensure of fishermen did "not cause the taking any
more than its licensure of automobiles and drivers solicits or causes federal crimes, even
though the automobiles it licenses are surely used to violate federal drug laws." Id. at 163-64.
The court rejected the analogy, observing that whereas it was possible for a person to use a car
without violating federal law, it was not possible for commercial fishermen to engage in the
licensed activity without risk of causing a take. Id. at 164. The court's distinguishing of the two
situations makes sense as far as it goes, but still relies on the faulty premise discussed in the
text, infra
124 Id.
125 Among other points, Professor Ruhl observes that Congress knew what to say if it had
wanted to extend liability to states for permitting and licensing decisions because it expressly
did so in section 7 with respect to federal agencies. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000) (requiring
federal agencies to consult with NMFS or FWS to ensure "any action authorized, funded, or
carried out" by such agencies will not jeopardize a protected species). See Ruhl, supra note 113,
at 73-74. As Ruhl points out, if Congress had actually imposed an obligation on states to pass
protective legislation, it would likely have run afoul of the Tenth Amendment. See id at 76. See
also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that the "[flederal government
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program") (quoting New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
gillnetters and lobstermen serve as intervening causes presents a proximate
cause question, but not a very difficult one. If the court's premise is wrong,
however, its causation analysis falls apart. If in the original position
gillnetters and lobstermen are free to fish without state permission, the state
does not "cause" harm by imposing only some restrictions on that fishing. 12 6
Consider a related illustration. A farmer intends to disc her land in
preparation for planting. Worried about dust from the discing, a city passes
an ordinance requiring the farmer to obtain a discing permit. The only way
she can get that permit is to show that the discing machine has a dust-
catching device. Suppose upon obtaining the permit, the farmer discs the
last remaining habitat of a particular field mouse. Does the permit "cause"
the harmful habitat modification? The intuitive and common sense response
is of course not. The harm to the field mouse arises independently of the
permit. The permit is not a but-for cause of the harm to the mouse because
the field was going to be disced anyway. Nor is the permit a substantial
factor in causing the harm. If anything, the permit made it less likely that the
land would be disced, not more. The fishing licenses in Strahan are no
different. The decision to prevent some harmful impacts is not the cause of
other impacts not prevented, absent a state duty to regulate which is
nowhere to be found in the ESA." 7
Professor Ruhl identifies a third theory of vicarious liability that he calls
the "inadequate regulation theory." 2 ' This theory is exemplified by the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of
Volusia ( Volusia County).'29 The case involved a suit against the County for
taking protected turtles. Upon hatching, turtles "instinctively crawl toward
the brightest light on the horizon."130 In nature, that light is the moon
126 Although the court's causation analysis is without discernible limits, it did otherwise limit
the reach of vicarious liability. The permit or license must authorize conduct "in specifically the
manner that is likely to result in a violation of federal law." Seig Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d at 164.
If it is possible for a person to carry out the permitted conduct without risk of violating the ESA,
then the government is not responsible for the individual's activities. Id at 163-64. But see
Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA., 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding EPA liable for the illegal
takes by individuals who misused the pesticides permitted). Other courts have articulated
additional limitations. A governmental third party cannot be held liable for nondiscretionary
permitting. See Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 602 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating that "the Coast
Guard's issuance of Certificates of Documentation is not discretionary and so does not trigger
the ESA"). And when the claim is that the government is liable for private conduct because it
failed to regulate adequately, the governmental entity must have primary authority to regulate
the conduct at issue. See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia, 148 F.3d 1231,
1249-50 (lth Cir. 1998) (finding standing to sue for a harmfully inadequate regulation where
the government entity possessed "primary authority to regulate").
127 Recognizing that Strahan is grounded in a nonexistent duty to regulate distinguishes it
from the cases where the state or local government is acting in a proprietary capacity. Where
the state owns the timber or the beach, it has the sane obligation as any property owner not to
modify the property in a way that causes death or injury to a protected species. In Strahan, the
state does not "own" the ocean in a proprietary sense. It has the authority, but not the
obligation, to regulate.
128 Ruhl, supra note 113, at 75.
129 148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998).
130 Id. at 1235.
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reflecting off the water, but "on a developed beach, the brightest light can be
an artificial inland source."'131 Turtles on some of the County's beaches were
becoming disoriented by artificial beach-front lighting and crawling the
wrong way to their death. In the process of addressing plaintiffs' standing to
sue, the Eleventh Circuit found that because the County possessed "primary
authority to regulate artificial beachfront lighting," it could be liable for
"'harmfully' inadequate regulation of artificial beachfront lighting." 132
Although Professor Ruhl places Volusia County in a separate, failure-to-
regulate category," it is really no different than Strahan. As discussed,
Strahan is grounded in failure-to-regulate reasoning. It is only if the state has
a duty to regulate the taking of right whales that its failure to do so can be
considered the cause of harm to the whales. If the state has no duty to
regulate, it does not cause a take when it sets up a permitting system that
restricts some but not all activities related to a protected species. Volusia
County simply makes more explicit what is implicit in Strahan-namely the
idea that state and local governments have a duty to regulate to prevent
harm to protected species. What is odd is that such a duty nowhere appears
in the ESA and is instead derived from the "cause to be committed" language
of section 9(g). 11 But it is certainly not in keeping with the ordinary
requirements of proximate cause-to use the language of footnote 13 in
Sweet Home-to find that the omission of an act that an actor is under no
obligation to perform is the proximate cause of any harm "caused" by that
omission. That the omission somehow "causes" the harm is of little moment,
unless one subscribes to something like a Mysterious Stranger theory of
causation under which everyone can be liable for everything because we are
all joint causes.'35
To describe the Eleventh Circuit's approach to causation in such
pejorative terms may be a bit overly critical because the court at least
limited its causation analysis to the constitutional standing inquiry of
whether the injury was fairly traceable to the defendant. The panel left "it to
the district court to decide the standard for causation for purposes of
liability." 136 And, as it turnied out, the district court on remand performed a
more sensible causation inquiry. Although it seemed to place some emphasis
on an interim ordinance that the County had adopted prohibiting harmful
lighting, 3 ' in the end the district court held that the County could not "be
made to assume liability for the act of its private citizens merely because it
has chosen to adopt regulations to ameliorate sea turtle takings."138 The
131 Id
132 Id. at 1249.
133 Ruhl, supra note 113, at 75.
134 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2000).
135 MARK TWAIN, No. 44, THE MYSTERIOUS STRANGER: BEING AN ANCIENT TALE FOUND IN A JUG
AND FREELY TRANSLATED FROM THE JUG (photo. reprint 1982) (1969).
136 Volusia County, 148 F.3d at 1252 n.24.
137 Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1307-08
(M.D. Fla. 2000). The court was not clear about whether it would have reached a different result
if the County had adopted no lighting ordinance at all.
138 Id. at 1308.
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reasoning seems plainly correct. It is only unfortunate that it took a trip up
to the Eleventh Circuit and back to achieve such a straightforward
proximate cause resolution.
The approach in Strahan and Volusia County has interesting
implications for the water context. Applying a vicarious liability theory
might allow a plaintiff to circumvent the difficulties of proving that any one
diversion causes harm (the joint causation problem) or of proving causation
by a senior right holder (the priority problem). Instead of targeting an
individual diverter, the plaintiff could target the state, arguing that its permit
scheme is causing the decrease in water and therefore causing harm to a
protected watercourse species. It is difficult to distinguish appropriation
permits from the fishing licenses in Strahan. In both cases, the permit
authorizes precisely the activity-gillnetting, lobstering, or diverting water-
that "causes" the harm.'39 Indeed, if one accepts the misguided notion of the
public trust doctrine that the state maintains a continuing ownership interest
in (as opposed to regulatory authority over) its waters,4 0 permits to
appropriate water may be more like the permits to ride ORVs on the town
beach in Town of Plymouth or the permit to cut trees in the national forest
in Yeutter"'
That said, for the same reason that the vicarious liability rationale fails
the tests of congressional intent and causation in Strahan and Volusia
County, it fails with respect to western prior appropriation schemes. It
defies credulity to suggest that Congress intended by section 9 to enlist,
contrary to the Tenth Amendment,' western states as the primary
enforcers of the ESA in watercourse situations. That common sense
conclusion may be what has prevented applications of the vicarious liability
theory to western water permitting systems.
The closest attempt to applying vicarious liability to water withdrawals
is the litigation over the Edwards Aquifer. The Aquifer is the exclusive water
source for the city of San Antonio and a variety of diverters and irrigation
districts. Unfortunately, excessive pumping of the Aquifer harmed protected
species dwelling in springs dried-up because of the pumping.14 3 The case
presented the classic causation conundrum-which pumper was causing the
harm and who should bear responsibility to ensure sufficient flows to the
139 As discussed above, to the extent an activity may be carried out without risk of a take,
issuance of a permit cannot be said to cause harm. See supra note 126. An example is a driver's
license.
140 See infra note 229 (summarizing the public trust doctrine).
141 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (discussing these two cases).
142 See supra note 125 (discussing the Tenth Amendment problems with compelling a state
to administer a federal program). Another difficulty with this approach is that it would be
contrary to the policy expressed in section 2 of the ESA that "Federal agencies shall cooperate
with State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in conceit with conservation of
endangered species." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2000). But see United States v. Glen-Colusa
Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("This provision does not require...
that state water rights should prevail over the restrictions set forth in the [ESA]. Such an
interpretation would render the Act a nullity.").
143 Sierra Club v. San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1997).
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depleted springs?144 If FWS was reluctant to enforce the ESA, one can
understand why. Nevertheless, in 1993, the Sierra Club sued FWS on the
theory that FWS's failure to implement and enforce the ESA was taking
protected species.145 Surprisingly, the district court agreed and established
minimum spring flows pending a determination by FWS of what spring flows
were necessary to avoid take.14 As the court saw it, those minimum spring
flows would provide the baseline against which FWS could pursue the state
if Texas refused to regulate withdrawals from the aquifer.147 Indeed,
assuming FWS's role as its own, the court ordered defendant-intervenor the
Texas Water Commission to prepare a plan "pursuant to which withdrawals
from the Edwards Aquifer can and will be limited to whatever extent may be
required to avoid unlawful takings of listed species." '148 Although the district
court's convoluted and unpublished opinion was never affirmed on appeal, 14 9
144 Although it does not make causation any easier, the causation question in Texas was not
intermingled with the issue of priority. Texas employs a rule of capture for groundwater. Any
property owner may drill a well and pump to his heart's content. See Sipriano v. Great Spring
Water of Am., Inc. 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). For a more comprehensive discussion, see Karen H.
Norris, The Stagnation of Texas Ground Water Law: A Political v. Environmental Stalemate, 22
ST. MARY's L.J. 493 (1990).
145 The legal hook for the Sierra Club and the court was FWS's duty under section 4(b) of the
ESA to develop a recovery plan. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1993); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000) ("The Secretary shall develop and
implement plans . . . for the conservation and survival of endangered and threatened
species....").
146 Lulan, 1993 WL 151353, at *33.
147 Id at *34.
148 Id The injunction against the Texas Water Commission (TWC) is slightly less
extraordinary than it may at first appear because the TWC had "asked to be assigned this task,
[and had] already performed it." See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 995 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1993)
(dismissing appeal of Judge Bunton's order for lack of jurisdiction). Texas and San Antonio,
however, could not have failed to hear Judge Bunton's message that he was prepared to order
relief against them for violation of section 9. See Lujan, 1993 WL 151353 at *33-35 (ordering that
plaintiffs could return to court if Texas did not implement "a regulatory system pursuant to
which withdrawals from the Edwards Aquifer can and will be limited to whatever extent may be
required to avoid unlawful takings of listed species").
149 The course of the Edwards Aquifer litigation following Judge Bunton's initial ruling is
complex and beyond the scope of this article. It is thoroughly reviewed in Todd H. Votteler, The
Little F)sh that Roared The Endangered Species Act, State Groundwater Law, and Private
Property Rights Collide over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. L. 845 (1998). Following
Judge Bunton's ruling, Texas created the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) which was then the
subject of a variety of constitutional and Voting Rights Act challenges. Id As wet years
alternated with drought, several additional lawsuits were filed under the ESA. In 1996, the
Sierra Club sued San Antonio and numerous other governmental and private entities, seeking
certification of a defendant class and arguing that their diversions constituted unlawful takes.
See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1997). When the Edwards
Aquifer Authority (EAA) refused to declare an emergency, Judge Bunton appointed a special
master and ordered the adoption of an emergency withdrawal reduction plan. Id. That order
was then stayed by the Fifth Circuit on Burford abstention grounds. Id. at 798. Then, during a
1998 drought period, FWS threatened to file civil lawsuits or bring criminal charges against
pumpers of the aquifer. Votteler, supra, at 872 (citing Jerry Needham, Suits Ready if Drought
,lls Wildlife, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 25, 1998, at 1A). In response, "EAA
implemented its plan, the Critical Period Management Plan, which restricted certain uses of
water.... Although flow at Comal Springs fell below the take level, USFWS did not file suit or
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its order is a glimpse of what the vicarious liability theory could look like in
the western water context. The primary distinction is that after Strahan, the
state water authority, rather than FWS, would have been the primary
defendant.'
Although the vicarious liability theory lies dormant with respect to the
water permit systems of western states, it may become a tempting
circumvention of the various difficulties associated with proving causation
of harm by an individual diverter.
III. ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARM AMONG
MULTIPLE HABITAT MODIFIERS
As discussed in Part II, the presence of multiple habitat modifiers-
joint causes in tort terminology-raises interesting questions with respect to
proving proximate causation of harm to individual animals. In many
instances, those questions will be easily resolved in favor of finding
causation."' In other instances, however, particularly where the joint causes
of species harm are water diverters with different priority rights, proving
causation will be more difficult.'52 In either instance, where the agency or
citizen plaintiff is able to prove proximate causation, another important
question will arise, namely how responsibility for the harm should be
apportioned among the multiple habitat modifiers. Should they be jointly
and severally responsible to remedy the species harm? If so, should there be
some right of contribution between them? Alternatively, should
responsibility be apportioned between the various habitat modifiers, either
ratably or in proportion to their contribution to the harm? In tort law, the
focus of this query is on a division of responsibility for damages; but in the
endangered species context, the remedial options are different. The issue is
whether there would be allocation of any civil penalty or, much more often,
bring criminal charges against pumpers or EAA." Id. This apparently led the Sierra Club to begin
mailing letters to individuals and entities pumping water from the Edwards Aquifer. The letters
alleged that the pumpers' activities were in violation of section 9 of the ESA and threatened to
file suit if necessary to remedy these actions. See Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir.
2002).
150 Even if the Sierra Club had a Strahan-like theory in mind, the decision to get at Texas
through FWS may have been necessitated by the fact that Texas employed a rule of capture
with respect to groundwater. The right to pump groundwater did not arise as a result of a
permit but as one of the sticks in the property owner's bundle. See supra note 144.
151 See supra Part II.D.5 (discussing two basic tort principles: first, that even where two acts
independently would not cause harm, when those acts combine to cause harm, both acts are
considered but-for causes; and second, that where two acts combine to cause a harm that could
have been caused by either act alone, both will be considered causes as long as each act was a
substantial factor in causing the harm).
152 See supra Part II.E (discussing why causation of instrearn flow harms should be
determined with reference to priority). See also supra note 78 and accompanying text (where
past habitat modification has increased the background probability of harm to a particular
species, the difficulty of proving that new habitat modification more probably than not caused
harm to an individual animal will increase).
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allocation of responsibility for compliance with the terms of an injunction
preventing some habitat modification. Both issues are addressed below.
A. Civil Penalties Under Section 11
Under section 11 of the ESA, the government may impose a civil penalty
of "not more than $25,000" for any take of a protected species where that
take is done "knowingly."" 3 If the take is not "knowing," the penalty is
$500.1' The courts have interpreted "knowingly" to mean only that the
defendant knowingly performed the harmful activity, not that the defendant
understood the action would have any effect on an endangered or
threatened species. 15 Although this civil penalty provision potentially
applies to takes caused by habitat modification, the government has been
reluctant to impose penalties for harm caused by otherwise lawful land-use
activities.156 For that reason, and because a $25,000 penalty is not
extraordinarily large, allocation of civil penalties has not been a particularly
troublesome issue for diverters or land-owners. Should the wildlife agencies
become more aggressive in pursuing civil penalties for habitat modification,
allocation may become more important, particularly because a separate
$25,000 penalty can be assessed for each separate violation. 157 If forty fish
turn up dead, a $25,000 penalty could be assessed for each fish ($1 million
total). 158
The key question will be whether the joint habitat modifiers should be
jointly and severally liable for the whole penalty or only for some
proportionate share. Recall that section 11 provides that "[alny person who
knowingly violates [section 9] may be assessed a civil penalty by the
153 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (2000).
154 Id, Section 11(b)(1) of the ESA allows the government to impose a maximum criminal
penalty of $50,000 and/or one year in jail for "knowing" violations of the ESA. Id § 1540(b)(1).
Under the sentencing guidelines, this criminal penalty can be increased up to $100,000 for
individuals and $200,000 for corporations. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2000). See generally TONY A.
SULLINS, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 55 (2001) (noting the reasons for this increase under the
sentencing guidelines).
155 United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant's
argument that he intended to shoot a dog which turned out to be an endangered gray wolf);
United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1991) (defendant's intent to capture a
turtle was sufficient even where defendant did not know the turtle was a listed species); United
States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (prosecution did not have to prove that
defendant knew subspecies of ESA-listed species to be convicted under knowing standard).
156 See Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity
and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 65, 68 (2001) (stating that "[tihe government rarely
attempts to impose severe civil penalties or press criminal charges in connection with land-use
activities that allegedly cause a prohibited taking").
157 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (2000) (indicating that a civil penalty may be assessed "for each
violation" and that "[elach violation shall be a separate offense").
158 A particularly aggressive regulator might read the statute as allowing the Secretary to
allege forty violations on the part of each of, for example, ten diverters who contributed to the
lack of instream flow, in which case the total penalty could climb to $10 million. It is hard to
imagine Congress intended this result.
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Secretary of not more than $25,000." 159 As the language makes clear, the
amount of any penalty is discretionary. The $25,000 figure is a ceiling on the
amount that the Secretary "may" assess. The Secretary is free to impose a
lesser penalty. Moreover, section 11 provides that "[a]ny such civil penalty
may be remitted or mitigated by the Secretary."16 ° Thus, in cases where joint
actors cause a single or multiple takes, the Secretary is free to apportion
liability according to the relative contribution or responsibility of the actors.
Because the civil penalty provision has been used so sparingly, neither
FWS nor NMFS has yet wrestled with the issue.1 61 Thus, the way is open for
both agencies to adopt an apportionment rule, either by rulemaking or as a
matter of prosecutorial discretion. To think cogently about this
apportionment question, the agencies will need to consider the trend in tort
law on the apportionment of damages. It is reviewed below. As it turns out,
the trend has relevance not just to the rather speculative inquiry about how
civil penalties might be apportioned if the government became more
aggressive in prosecuting habitat modifiers but also to the more pressing
issue of responsibility for injunctive relief, an issue which will also be
discussed further below.
B. Apportionment of Damages in Tort Cases
To understand the approach to apportionment in tort law to cases of
joint causation, it is first useful to understand what is meant by the phrase
"joint causation." Originally, the term "joint tort" or "joint causation"
referred to cases where the various defendants acted in concert and by
design to commit the tort together.16 Because all acted with a common
purpose in a joint enterprise, each was jointly and severally liable for the
entire damage.1 3 As a procedural matter, all of the tortfeasors could be
joined in a single action. Early on, however, they could not seek contribution
from each other, based on the notion that where they had acted in concert,
and thus committed a deliberate wrong, no tortfeasor should be able to seek
an offset.14
This sort of joint tort or joint causation, which depended upon the
defendants acting in concert, should be distinguished from those situations,
much more analogous to the ESA context, where persons engage in
159 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (emphasis added).
160 Id.
161 NOAA has asserted the general regulatory authority to "assess a civil penalty against two
or more respondents jointly and severally. Each respondent is liable for the entire penalty, but
no more than the amount finally assessed may be collected from the respondents." See 15
C.F.R. § 904.107 (2002). Although this should apply to ESA enforcement actions, it is not
apparent that NOAA Fisheries (NMFS) has considered the issue in the ESA context.
162 KEETON, ET AL., supra note 31, at 322-23.
163 Id at 323.
164 Id. at 323, 336-37. Later, in England, the rule against contribution was limited to cases
where the plaintiff had been a willful and conscious wrongdoer and was not applied in cases of
negligence. Id. at 337.
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independent acts which combine to cause a single injury to the plaintiff.165 In
early American cases, joinder was not permitted in such cases where the
acts were independent.166 This meant that each defendant had to be sued
separately and that each defendant could be severally responsible for the
entire loss. 16 7 Although plaintiff was entitled to only one satisfaction, if
plaintiff did not like an initial judgment, he could speculate on the possibility
that a second judgment against a second defendant would result in a more
generous verdict. 6 Whereas each defendant was liable for the entire loss,
each was not jointly liable for the same sum; each defendant's liability was
judged separately (a very rough form of comparative fault). 169 Typically,
whatever the judgment against him, courts allowed a defendant to seek
contribution from the other independent tortfeasors, except in cases of
willful misconduct.
170
The practice of allowing contribution actions began to change with the
adoption of the New York Field Code of Procedure in 1848 and similar
efforts in other states, which emphasized resolving all questions connected
with a particular occurrence in a single law suit. Under the new procedural
codes, joinder became the norm for independent actors who had contributed
to a single tort.'7' But once joinder was allowed, just as it had always been in
cases of concerted action, courts reached the odd conclusion that the "no
contribution" rule of concerted action cases should also apply in cases
where independent acts had produced a single harm.'72 Thus, instead of the
prior approach of assessing liability against each independent tortfeasor in
separate judgments and then allowing contribution, liability was assessed
jointly for the same sum and then contribution was denied. This dubious
practice continued into the 1970s in all but nine American jurisdictions.7 3
The practice of holding independent tortfeasors jointly and severally
liable and then refusing to allow contribution claims was subjected to heavy
criticism throughout the twentieth century. 1 4 The criticism began to bear
165 Id at 323.
166 See id. at 325; JOHN FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 257-58 (8th ed. 1992); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 11, cmt. a, reporters' note at 109-10 (2000)
("Before the advent of comparative responsibility, 'several liability' was employed to describe a
defendant who was responsible for all of the plaintiffs damnages but who could not be joined in
a suit with any other defendant who may also have been responsible.").
167 KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 328-29.
168 Id at 330-32.
169 Id. at 329-31.
170 Id. at 337.
171 See id. at 325-28.
172 Id. at 337.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 337-38. The criticisms were summed up this way:
There is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of
a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be
shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution,
the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs whim or spite, or the plaintiffs
collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free.
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fruit in the 1970s when comts and legislatures began to make major changes
to the law relating to contribution and apportionment of damages between
joint tortfeasors. Almost all states now allow contribution claims among
independent joint tortfeasors.17
At the same time they were addressing contribution issues, states were
wrestling with contributory negligence and joint and several liability more
generally. Recall that at common law, if a plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, even in the least degree, plaintiff was barred from recovery. 176
Commentators, courts, and legislators became increasingly disenchanted
with a rule that seemed to deny plaintiff recovery in so many deserving
cases.17 7 Thus, throughout the 1900s, courts and legislatures began to modify
the rule of contributory negligence, adopting a number of approaches-most
often labeled as "comparative negligence"' 7S-that allowed plaintiffs to
recover compensation for the portion of their injuries not attributable to
their own negligence. 79 Although comparative negligence took several
forms, the movement toward proportional assignment of responsibility was
unmistakable and today only four states and the District of Columbia
continue to use the rule of contributory negligence.'°
As states moved toward a system of proportional recovery, questions
were raised about the wisdom of retaining joint and several liability. If
plaintiffs recovery could be proportionally based on plaintiffs comparative
responsibility for an accident, why couldn't multiple defendants'
175 Id. at 338-39. See generally Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Symposium, Understanding State
Contribution Laws and Their Effect on the Settlement of Mass TortActions, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1701
(1995) (analyzing the contribution laws in all of the states). A contribution claim can be raised
in several ways. It can arise as a cross-claim against another defendant already named in the
main action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g). It can arise via impleader as a third-party action against a
defendant not named in the main action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Alternatively, it can arise in a
separate contribution action filed after completion of the underlying case.
176 KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 451-52. This harsh rule was ameliorated somewhat by
the doctrine of last clear chance-the idea that a plaintiffs contributory negligence would not
bar recovery if following plaintiffs negligence, defendant had a last clear chance to avoid the
harm. Id at 463-64; see also Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584, 588 (W. Va. 1981).
177 KEETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 468-77 (describing the development of arguments against
contributory negligence).
178 Id. at 468-80 (describing approaches to "comparative negligence").
179 In some jurisdictions, a plaintiff can recover defendant's proportionate responsibility
without respect to the extent of plaintiffs own proportion of fault (so-called "pure comparative
negligence" states). Id at 471-73 (discussing the pure comparative negligence rule). In other
jurisdictions plaintiffs recovery depends on whether plaintiffs own fault was less than the
defendant's fault (sometimes called 49% jurisdictions) or not greater than defendant's fault
(sometimes called 50% jurisdictions). Id. at 473-74 (discussing these modified comparative
negligence approaches). Applying the latter two approaches presents some additional
complexities where there are multiple defendants. Some states compare the negligence of
plaintiff to each defendant; other states compare plaintiffs negligence to the defendants'
collective percentage of negligence. Id Finally, Nebraska and South Dakota apply a fourth
approach under which plaintiff cannot recover unless his negligence is "slight" and the
defendant's negligence is "gross." Id at 474.
180 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
598 (10th ed. 2000) (listing Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia in addition to the
District of Columbia).
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responsibility likewise be determined proportionally? For some, this was a
reason to push for allowing contribution actions against joint tortfeasors.
The defendants would still be jointly and severally liable for the fill
judgment but through contribution actions they could apportion the
judgment among themselves. For others, the switch to comparative fault
was a reason to push for a system of proportionate several liability under
which not only plaintiff but all defendants would be obligated only for that
portion of the injury for which they were responsible. In the former case, of
course, the risk of insolvency of any particular defendant fell upon the
solvent defendants, whereas in the latter case, it fell upon the plaintiff who
could only recover from each defendant her specific share.
Unsurprisingly, there was and remains a vigorous debate about the
merits of joint and several liability versus proportionate several liability,
with the plaintiffs bar advocating the former, the defense bar the latter, and
commentators on both sides of the issue.'81 The Restatement (Third) of
Torts provides that damages should be apportioned as long as there is "a
reasonable basis for dividing the damages."'182 Where the extent of the
various contributions to the harm are indivisible, the Restatement indicates
that different states have taken different approaches and that the "clear
trend over the past several decades has been a move away from pure joint
and several liability."'83 Nevertheless, much of joint and several liability
remains. In looking at what the various states have done, some fifteen
jurisdictions retain joint and several liability, and almost all of those provide
for a right of contribution. 8 4 Sixteen states have adopted proportionate
several liability.'8 5 The other states have adopted some mix of the two,
employing a wide variety of approaches.
8 6
181 Compare Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response
to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1125 (1989) (responding to critics of proportionate several
liability) with Richard W. Wright, Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater A Reply to
Professor Twerski, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1147 (1989) (advocating retention of joint and several
liability) and Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1164 (1988) (discussing reform debate and citing other sources).
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. f, at 323 (2000).
This is a continuation of the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which took the
position that defendants should be liable only for a portion of the harm if there is a reasonable
basis for apportionment or division according to the relative responsibility of each defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 881. Illustration 5 describes two defendants who
negligently discharge oil into a stream, making the water unusable by a lower riparian. The
injury is treated as divisible because the respective contributions (of 70% and 30%) can be
measured.
183 RESTATEMENT (TIURD) OF TORTS § 17 reporter's note cmt. a (2000).
184 Brief Anici Curiae of American Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 23, Norfolk
& Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210 (2003) (No. 01-963) [hereinafter Law Professors
Amicus Brief]. The brief can be found at 2002 WL 1964118.
185 Id. A few of these states retain joint and several liability for claims involving
environmental pollution and hazardous waste. Id.
186 Id at 23-25. Some states retain joint and several liability unless plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. See id. at 23 (Georgia, Oklahoma, and Washington). Other states retain
joint and several liability only for those defendants whose comparative responsibility is more
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C. Appling Tort LawApportionment Principles to
Section l's Civil Penalty Provision
The above review of the development of apportionment principles in
tort law is obviously not a perfect fit for a civil penalty or injunctive relief
under the ESA. If the amount of the civil penalty in cases where the harm is
caused by a lack of instream flow were designed to compensate for the take
by making nature and the public whole (the approach of tort law, as
reflected in the Restatement), the civil penalty would be allocated under a
rule of proportionate several liability because the water right or the amount
of water withdrawn will typically provide a "reasonable basis" for dividing
the penalty among the various diverters.'5 7 By contrast, in situations of
multi-actor habitat modification where the harm is not the result of a water
deficit and sorting out precise contributions to the harm is more difficult
(point and nonpoint source pollution of a watercourse, land development,
timber harvest, etc.), the Restatement's direction is less clear, suggesting
that either joint and several liability with contribution or proportionate
several liability is viable. In no case, however, does the Restatement
recommend the wildlife agencies' current approach of joint and several
liability without a right of contribution between the joint habitat modifiers.
The analogy to tort law, however, is not entirely apt. In tort law a key
question is whether the risk of a defendant's insolvency should be born by
plaintiff (proportionate several liability) or the other defendants (joint and
several liability with contribution). But because the civil penalty is designed
to deter, and not as a damages measure to make nature and the public
whole, the critical question is not whether the government is fully
"compensated" but whether the defendants are deterred and fairly penalized
according to their relative responsibility for the harm. To the extent that
relative responsibility is the primary concern and compensating the plaintiff
is relatively unimportant, the impetus of tort law seems to be in favor of
allocating any penalty on a proportionate several basis.
The fact that tort law points toward a form of proportionate several
responsibility for whatever civil penalty is assessed begs the question
whether the agencies have the authority to adopt such an approach. As
suggested above, section 11 allows for the Secretary to consider equitable
than a certain percentage, ranging from 25% to 60%. Id. (Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin). Mississippi retains joint and several liability for up to 50% of the
damages. Id Other states retain joint and several liability for economic damages but not for
noneconomic damages, or for some percentage of noneconomic damages. Id at 24-25 (Hawaii,
New York, California, Florida, Nebraska, Iowa, and Ohio). Still other states (Oregon and
Missouri) retain joint and several liability but allocate any orphan shares-the percentage of the
harm attributed to an insolvent tortfeasor-between the solvent defendants and the plaintiff. Id.
at 22. For another overview of state legislation, see Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple
Responsible Causes A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and
Risk Exposure, supra note 181, at 1164-68. Professor Wright wrote the Law Professors Brief
relied on in notes 184-85.
187 The exception to this, as discussed below, may be those situations in which water rights
are not clearly defined, as in the case of some on-going stream adjudications. In such cases,
shifting the burden to the defendant to seek contribution may be more appealing.
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factors, such as proportionate responsibility, in assessing the penalty.1 88 In
the absence of congressional direction in other statutes, federal courts have
developed a federal common law of apportionment. The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 189 for
example, is silent about apportionment of liability.9 0 But federal courts have
held that apportionment is available under CERCLA whenever the defendant
is able to prove that there is a reasonable basis for apportioning liability.'91
Courts have likewise implied a common law right of contribution under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 92 in an effort to
equitably apportion wrongdoing.193 The Supreme Court has approved
apportionment principles under federal labor laws.'94 Thus, if the wildlife
agencies choose to become more aggressive in imposing civil penalties for
harmful habitat modification, the path is clear for the agencies to adopt an
apportionment rule for assessing penalties, or at least informally apportion
the penalty as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
D. Injunctive Relief Under Section 11 and Habitat Conservation Planning
While the agencies have not made much use of the civil penalty
provision for habitat modification,19 5 they, and private citizen plaintiffs, have
been somewhat more aggressive about using section 11 of the ESA to seek
injunctive relief against proposed habitat modification. Section 11 authorizes
the Department of Justice, by way of enforcement actions, and private
citizens, by way of citizen suits, to seek injunctions against any action,
including habitat modification, that might violate the ESA. 196 Unlike the
188 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (discussing section 11).
189 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
190 See United States v. Hercules Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 715-16 (8th Cir. 2001) (discussing these
facets of CERCLA), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001).
191 Bell Petroleum Servs. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 904 (5th Cir. 1993). For additional cases
allowing apportionment between CERCLA defendants, see United States v. Township of
Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 319 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d
711, 722 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270-71 (3d Cir.
1992); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988).
192 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
193 Circuit courts are split on this issue with the Seventh and Second Circuits finding a right
of contribution and the Ninth Circuit rejecting such a right. Compare Chemung Canal Trust Co.
v. Sovran Bank, 939 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1991) (permitting co-trustee remedy of contribution),
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992); and Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 464
(7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939 (1991) (same), with Call v. Sumitomo Bank of Cal., 881
F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir. 1989) (ERISA does not allow actions for contribution) and Kim v.
Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). See also Youngberg v. Bekins Co., 930
F. Supp. 1396, 1403 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (sante); Duncan v. Santaniello, 900 F. Supp. 547, 550 (D.
Mass. 1995) (finding right to contribution among fiduciaries); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v.
Salomon Bros., 832 F. Supp. 1169, 1177-79 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same).
194 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967) (apportioning liability between employer
and union "according to the damage caused by the fault of each").
195 See supra note 156 and infra note 198 (discussing this reluctance).
196 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6), (g) (2000).
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sparsely employed civil penalty remedy, in the case of injunctive relief,
courts and agencies have some track record on allocation. Their practice has
been to follow the anachronistic approach of pre-1970 tort law and use what
is in essence joint and several liability without a right of contribution. FWS
and NMFS have exercised discretion in seeking to enjoin one, several, or all
contributors to species harm. In the water context, agency discretion has led
to concentration on water districts, Bureau of Reclamation projects, and
other major diverters.197 It is simply easier to pursue one defendant because
as long as that defendant has rights to a sufficient amount of water, a
complete remedy is available. In the land context, the focus has also been on
landowners with large blocks of habitat.
Although the agencies have employed this joint-and-several-liability-
without-contribution approach to allocating the burden of providing habitat,
it would be inaccurate to suggest that the agencies commonly seek
injunctive relief under section 11. That is not the case. The reality is that
much more often section 11 is used to drive habitat modifiers to the
bargaining table.
Federal agencies have not been eager to seek civil penalties or even to
impose injunctive relief for a number of reasons. One reason has been the
focus of this article. Proving that habitat modification will be the proximate
cause of harm, and therefore take, can be a daunting and uncertain task,
particularly in the case of individual water diverters19 5 A second reason is
that application of the ESA and section 9 to private property owners has
been subjected to so much criticism that politically it does not make sense
for the agencies to be aggressive. 99 Nevertheless, if uncertainty about
proving proximate causation makes the agencies shy away from the
courtroom, that same uncertainty makes habitat modifiers nervous about
legal exposure. Businesses crave certainty. The only way to get that
certainty under the ESA is to obtain an incidental take permit under section
10, which authorizes an otherwise prohibited taking "if such taking is
197 See supra note 3 and infra note 198 (discussing recent targets of ESA enforcement).
198 Concern about proving causation has produced some reluctance to prosecute diverters
for take. Telephone Interview with Henry Maddox, Director of Upper Basin Colorado River
Endangered Fish Recovery Program, Fish and Wildlife Service (June 23, 1999). Mr. Maddox
stated that his office had decided not to pursue section 9 prosecutions for diversions that may
have contributed to take by diminishing instream flows, in part because of the difficulties of
proving causation. They prefer to rely on the consultation process of section 7. He noted that
they more often use section 9 against diverters when FWS has "a body" and when the diversion
works themselves are causing the death or injury. He did note, however, that at one time FWS
had threatened the Provo River Water Users Association with a take prosecution because its
diversions from the Bureau of Reclamation's Deer Creek Reservoir were causing extremely low
flows in a portion of the Provo River below the dam and harming the protected June sucker
(Chasnustes lioros). Id See also Telephone Interview with Reed Harris, Field Supervisor, Salt
Lake City Field Office, Fish & Wildlife Service, Region 6 (June 23, 1999) (also indicating that
FWS prefers using section 7 to section 9 and that FWS was not in the habit of prosecuting
diverters for take absent finding a dead fish).
199 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REv. 305, 321-24 (1997) (discussing this political environment and FWS's
attempts to respond).
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incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful
activity."200 To receive a permit, the project proponent must negotiate an
acceptable Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP), 201 which must consider
alternatives and include steps to minimize and mitigate any impact on a
listed species from the activity.202
Negotiation always occurs in the shadow of the law. Thus, in large
measure, the content of an HCP (essentially how much habitat the property
ownier will be required to give up to obtain the permit) depends upon the
parties' 20 3 understanding of section 9 and specifically whether the agency
could prove causation and what sort of rules govern allocation of
responsibility. Commentators, for example, have suggested that the
uncertainty about proving causation has allowed the agencies to extract
more concessions than otherwise would be allowed under Sweet Home.2°4
Likewise, the negotiation of multiparty HCPs reflects the result one would
expect where the underlying law is one of joint and several liability with no
right of contribution. As described by Professor Thompson:
In the absence of statutory guidelines, political dynamics have shaped choices
among different burden distribution options. Property owners often have
succeeded in shifting at least some of the burden onto general taxpayers....
200 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000).
201 Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). An HCP "must accompany an application for an incidental take
permit." U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS AND THE INCIDENTAL TAKE
PERMITTING PROCESS 1 (2001), available at
http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/HCPIncidental Take.pdf. See generally Marj Nelson, HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING, at http://endangered.fws.gov/esb/99/11-12/12-13.pdf (reviewing the
HCP process).
202 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000). For an excellent overview of the HCP process see J.B.
Ruhl, How to ill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of Endangered Species Act
"HCP"Permits for RealEstate Development 5 ENVTL. LAw. 345, 376-96 (1999). See also SULLINS,
supra note 154, at 89-96.
203 HCPs are most often negotiated between FWS or NMFS and a single actor, although some
regional HCPs have been developed. See Thompson, supra note 199, at 316-17 (reviewing
statistics on incidental take penrits).
204 One commentator has remarked that FWS has tended to apply a broader definition of
harm when negotiating incidental take permits, noting that in such situations:
FWS typically gauges the potential effects of a project based on a conservation
biologist's view of harm that barely resembles the rule adopted by FWS in 1981 and
sustained by Sweet Home. In the world of the FWS biologist, habitat modification alone
still equals take. From the agency's standpoint, evaluating projects with a broad view of
harm enables FWS to demand more mitigation from permit applicants than it would be
able to justify under the narrow view of harm.
Glen & Douglas, supra note 156, at 89, 132. Logically, it might seem that the same uncertainty
would cause the agencies to make unwanted concessions. One reason why this may not be true
is that when the agencies negotiate an HCP and incidental take permit, they must comply not
only with section 9 of the ESA but also with section 7. Under section 7, any action "authorized,
funded, or carried out" by a federal agency-and this would include incidental take permits and
accompanying HCPs-must not "jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [a species's critical
habitat]." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). As discussed in Part V infra, section 7 raises separate
causation issues and takes a broader approach to causation than section 9.
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Case studies of regional HCP processes also suggest that larger property
owners are able to shift at least some of the burden onto smaller, less organized
landholders.20 5
If the agency has discretion to assign liability to any landowner or
diverter, simple public choice theory suggests that the parties who are better
organized or have more property at risk have a greater incentive to mobilize
and encourage the agency to pass along responsibility to the less-organized
or more diffusely impacted. 20 6 Thus, even though the agencies have not been
aggressive about using section 9 for injunctive relief, their approach to
allocation matters because it has an impact on the HCP negotiation process.
E. Applying Tort Law Apportionment Principles to
Section 11's Injunctive Relief Provision
There is nothing that would prevent either the wildlife agencies, by way
of rulemaking, or courts from adopting a rule of apportionment in cases of
irunctive relief where there are multiple habitat modifiers. Indeed, courts
do not even need to develop a general rule of apportionment. When a court
decides whether to grant injunctive relief, it is sitting in equity. When a court
sits as a chancellor in equity, it is free to grant, deny, or tailor injunctive
relief in accord with principles of equity. As the Supreme Court remarked in
Romero-Barcelo:
[Tihe traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the competing claims. In such cases, the court balances
the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they
may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction. The essence
of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather
than rigidity has distinguished it.207
Thus, in weighing the balance of hardships and equities, a court may decide
not to compel a complete abatement of the offending activity but instead
only require some adjustment.208
Despite this general rule of equity, when Congress passes a statute
authorizing injunctive relief it "may go further and also mandate issuance of
205 Thompson, supra note 199, at 320-21.
206 For further elaboration of this basic point about public choice theory, see generally
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
207 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). See also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978) ("It is correct, of course,
that a federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction
for every violation of law."). Cf Water Keeper Alliance v. United States Dep't of Def., 271 F.3d
21, 34 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding that in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction for
an alleged ESA violation it was appropriate to consider national security interests of training on
Vieques).
208 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 115-23, 774-75 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the
flexibility of injunctive relief and citing cases).
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an injunction whenever the conduct condemned by the statute is found to
exist."2 9 A number of commentators have argued that the ESA is such a
statute, citing the famous Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill21° where the
Court enjoined an almost-completed dam to protect a snail darter (Percina
tanasi) at the cost of millions of dollars.21' There, the Court refused to
consider the hardship on the TVA because "Congress ha[d] spoken in the
plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been
struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities."
212
The Court's decision in Hill that an injunction must issue where the harm
would be caused by a single defendant, does not, however, compel a similar
result in the case of multiple habitat modifiers. That Congress struck the
balance in favor of the protected species does not mean that Congress
struck an inequitable balance between multiple defendants. As Professor
Plater points out in his article on equitable remedies for statutory violations,
although courts may lack discretion to substitute their own judgment for
that of Congress with respect to whether a statutory violation should be
abated, courts maintain discretion with respect to how to tailor the
injunction.213 Judicial apportionment of responsibility for injunctive relief
among multiple parties is just such a tailoring approach. 14
It is hard to see an equitable objection to proportionally allocating
responsibility among joint habitat modifiers who are neither acting in
concert nor engaging in an inherently wrongful action. The tougher question
for most will be whether apportionment would hinder the aim of species
protection. If courts began equitably apportioning injunctive relief, the
wildlife agencies, or citizen plaintiffs, would need to join more defendants in
any section 11 action.215 Undoubtedly, this would increase the administrative
209 Id. at 779.
210 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
211 See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 524, 586-88 (1982); DOBBS, supra note 208, at 120, 779-81.
212 Hill, 437 U.S. at 194.
213 See Plater, supra note 211, at 592.
214 Jeff Lewin has made a related argument for apportioned injunctions in nuisance cases:
But how would apportionment work in a nuisance suit in which the plaintiff sought
injunctive relief? Would the plaintiff whose share of responsibility was 20/6 receive 80%
of an injunction? In a sense, the answer is "yes!" Or, to be more precise, the plaintiff
whose share of responsibility was 20% could receive 100% of the injunctive relief sought,
but might be required to compensate the defendant for 20% of the defendant's cost of
compliance.
Jeff Lewin, Comparative Nuisance, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1009, 1046 (1989).
215 Whether joinder of all defendants would be compulsory would be resolved with reference
to FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) which provides, in pertinent part, that:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive a court
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). The language of the rule suggests that where proportionate several
responsibility is the rule, joinder might be required, whereas if joint and several responsibility
with some right of contribution were the rule, joinder might not be compulsory. Defendants, of
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burden, but that seems a reasonable price for avoiding the inequity of
imposing the entire habitat burden on the most convenient habitat modifier.
Moreover, the agencies could arguably pursue only the largest and most
obvious habitat modifiers for their primary share and simply leave aside de
uinimis habitat modifiers.216 In any event, as common law courts handling
tort cases during the twentieth century increasingly understood,
administrative convenience cannot trump the basic unfairness of joint and
several liability without contribution.
If proportional allocation of injunctive relief is the best general rule for
cases involving multiple habitat modifiers, another question arises: Is
proportional allocation also the best approach for allocating responsibility
for instream flow harms between multiple water diverters of different
priority? Certainly, a shift to ratable or proportionate sharing of the section 9
obligation would be an advance over the current approach which allows the
entire regulatory burden to fall on one unlucky diverter without regard to
seniority.217 But a further refinement of any equitable allocation in the water
context would again consider the priority status of the diverters. Under such
an approach, the agencies would be obligated to demand any necessary
water from the junior-most diverter. Basically, the agencies would work
their way up the priority line until they had enough water for the at-risk
species.
There may be some concern that determining priority will not always be
as easy as it sounds. Although the priority system is clear in concept, on
many western streams the actual amount and priority of the various water
rights is uncertain. The task of quantifying and prioritizing water rights via
general stream adjudications has been arduous and expensive. Stream
adjudications can continue for years and years without a resolution.21 If
course, might seek to join other defendants under FED. R. Civ. P. 14 which sets forth the third-
party practice rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
216 In fact, at one point the Clinton Administration proposed exempting small landowners
and low impact activities from section 9 where only threatened species were involved. See
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule Exempting Certain Small
Landowners and Low-Impact Activities From Endangered Species Act Requirements for
Threatened Species, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,419, 37,421 (July 20, 1995) ("The three exceptions apply to
single household dwellings on 5 acres of land or less, low-impact activities that result in the
cumulative disturbance of less than 5 acres of land, and activities that otherwise are found by
the Service to be negligible in their effects upon a threatened species."). Because section 9
prohibits "any person" from taking an endangered species, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000), the
wildlife agencies may lack authority to create such an exception for endangered species. Recall
that section 9 only applies to threatened species by virtue of the agencies use of a section 4(d)
rule. See supra note 14 (explaining this process).
217 As a matter of economic theory, proportionate sharing is also an advance over the
current approach. To the extent the entire burden can be visited on a single user, all water
rights along a river are destabilized. But if each water user knows the burden will be shared,
only their water with the least marginal utility is put at risk.
218 See, e.g., Reid P. Chambers & John E. Echohawk, Implementing the Winters Doctrine of
Indian Reserved Water Rights: Producing Indian Water and Economic Development Without
Injuring Non-Indian Water Users? 27 GONz. L. REV. 447, 456 (1991/92) (noting how costly and
protracted stream adjudications are because "all water users on a given stream system must be
joined as parties, hundreds or even thousands of parties are commonly involved").
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injunctive relief necessitated a stream adjudication to determine who was
junior, it might effectively preclude enforcement of section 9 in the river
environment. Although legitimate, the concern about the uncertainty of
existing rights is not a sufficient excuse to keep the current enforcement
approach. First, not all western watercourses are unadjudicated messes;
many are characterized by clearly defined water rights. If considering
priority is the wiser approach, its unavailability on some streams should not
preclude its use on all streams. Second, the uncertainty that bedevils most
stream adjudications is greatest with respect to the quantity and priority of
water rights established prior to a permit system and with respect to federal
and Indian reserved water rights.219 The relative priority of the water rights
established after adoption of a permit system is more easily determinable. At
the very least the agencies could make a good faith effort to pursue those
most junior by reference to the priority dates of their permits.
Still, some might argue, in a number of cases the nature of water rights
will remain uncertain. Moreover, even where the paper priorities are
determinable, demanding a junior's water right on over-appropriated
streams (of which there are many in the West) will not actually put any
water back in the stream for the endangered species. Again however, those
worries do not lead to the conclusion that the current approach of joint and
several liability without contribution is a good idea. If anything they point
toward an approach analogous to joint and several liability with a right of
contribution. To explain, if one views administrative convenience as a pre-
eminent concern (just like one might view a plaintiffs complete recovery in
tort as the primary concern), the wildlife agencies could be allowed to
proceed against any diverter but that diverter would then have the right to
demand that junior diverters forego their diversions in favor of her more
senior right. In water law terms, a senior targeted to bear the regulatory
burden would have the ability to "call the river."220
Implying a right of contribution in a federal statute is permissible.2 1
And this sort of call-the-river contribution makes sense. Indeed, it would
seem that a senior obligated to provide more instream flow for an
endangered species might already have an argument under state law for
calling the river. However, the difficulty with this call-the-river contribution
is that it requires state administrative action to make the ESA work.
Although a state could choose to adopt such an approach, the Tenth
219 C. Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Symposium, Revisiting Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States-There Must Be a Better Way, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 597, 600
(1995) (discussing how in two Arizona stream adjudications the parties struggled "ten to fifteen
years just to establish a procedure to deal with the complexities of the federal rights of the
United States and Indian tribes").
220 "Calling the river" is a common water law expression for the idea that a senior
appropriator may ask the state engineer or water regulator to curtail the diversions of upstream
juniors so that the senior may receive his full water right. See GEORGE A. GOULD & DOUGLAS L.
GRANT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 68-69 (6th ed. 2000).
221 A right of contribution, for example, was implied under CERCLA. See Centerior Serv. Co.
v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Amendment may preclude imposing it on the state.222 It thus may still be a
better approach for the wildlife agencies to suffer some additional
administrative burden and identify and pursue junior appropriators with
sufficient water to satisfy the habitat concerns. To the extent juniors have
concerns about being unfairly targeted because seniors are not making
beneficial use of their senior water rights, the juniors already have a
contribution claim under state law in the form of a waste action.2
23
On balance, allocating injunctive relief by priority, just like determining
causation by priority, would be an equitable and efficient advance over
current law. The seniors' legitimate reliance interests in diverting their full
amount prior to junior diversions would be protected. Allocating by priority
would thus promote greater certainty and predictability. Rather than
guessing at whom the wildlife agencies might target for an injunction or in
an HCP negotiation, the parties would have a firm understanding of where
the allocation burden is likely to fall. Not only would this make negotiation
easier but the clearer delineation of the property right would promote much
needed market reallocation of water to more efficient uses.224
IV. POTENTIAL CONCERNS WITH APPLYING PRIORITY STATUS TO
QUESTIONS OF CAUSATION AND APPORTIONMENT
Because section 9 has been employed so sparingly, particularly in cases
of river harm, there remains room for integrating principles of prior
appropriation into the causation analysis and also into the apportionment of
responsibility. Senior appropriators would not be considered the cause of
harm, or be allocated injunctive responsibility, unless shutting down all
diverters of junior priority would be insufficient to protect the threatened or
endangered wildlife. Some of the concerns about such an approach have
been discussed above. This brief section addresses two more potential
concerns with considering priority in determining causation and allocation.
222 See supiv note 125 (discussing this Tenth Amendment principle). David Filippi has
suggested that the federal agencies make a greater effort to accommodate state water users by
pursuing some form of a memorandum of agreement with the state. See Filippi, supra note 3, at
22-26 ("Such coordination could enable the water resources department and its local staff to
work with water users to undertake voluntary flow restoration measures, which might obviate
the need for enforcement action.").
223 For an overview of the doctrine that water rights will be lost if not put to beneficial use
(i.e. wasted), see generally Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The
Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998) (reviewing
historical application of beneficial use doctrine and its future prospects). Implying a
contribution action for waste might enhance the efficiency gains of allocating with reference to
priority by creating an additional incentive to make beneficial use of a water resource. That
said, the existing waste doctrine has had limited impact in that regard. Id. at 985-87.
224 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing why clarity of property rights
promotes market solutions).
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A. Fairness to Junior Appropriators
Some might worry that even if allocating the entire responsibility to the
most junior appropriators is more efficient, it appears unfair. Although
juniors have notice that they might lose their right to divert in times of
natural drought, a critic might argue, juniors are not necessarily on notice
that they will be responsible for changes in the law, or what some have
called a "regulatory drought.""2 5 Under this view, watershed health is a
community responsibility and it is not equitable to have a few juniors bear
the entire burden. This argument, however, does not withstand scrutiny. As
an initial matter, it is not clear that destabilizing all water rights to avoid
greater destabilization of already tenuous rights produces a net gain in
fairness. Moreover, if the core fairness concern is the juniors' reliance
interest, that concern points toward greater solicitude for senior
appropriators. As a simple historical matter, most senior rights in the West
were appropriated at a time when the appropriator understood there to be
little chance of regulatory interference with his water right.226 Another
criticism of this fairness concern is that it is premised on the notion that
natural drought and regulatory drought are wholly separable. However,
another way to conceive of any instream flow problem is as a "hybrid
drought."227 Regulations mandating more instream flow for environmental
purposes tend not to matter in high flow years. It is typically a combination
of natural drought and regulation that creates the problem. To the extent
that regulatory impact cannot be neatly disconnected from a natural
drought, fairness suggests that the junior should bear the hybrid burden.
225 See George A. Gould, The Public Trust Doctrine and Water Rights, 34 RocKY MT. MIN L.
INST. 25-1, 25-36 (1988) (suggesting that allocating by priority in the public trust context "seems
inequitable [in charging junior appropriators] with the risk of unpredicted changes in the law").
To the extent the appropriation occurred after the Mono Lake case, discussed infra note 230, or
the passage of the ESA, a junior appropriator's reliance argument is weakened, although neither
the Mono Lake case nor the ESA set forth an allocation mechanism.
226 Consider, for instance, the situation in which the senior appropriator has a 1910 water
right and the junior a 1975 right, which came into existence two years after the passage of the
ESA. Although there is significant doubt about whether the ESA inhered in the senior's title as
part of the federal govermnent's latent right to regulate, there seems little doubt that the ESA
inhered in the title of the junior appropriator. Recall that in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court held that where a regulation denied a property owner
all economically viable use of her property it would be a perse taking unless the regulation was
justified by background principles of common law that inhered in the property right to begin
with. Id. at 1015-16. Whether the ESA inheres in the junior's title actually presents an
interesting twist on the Supreme Court's recent decision in PaLazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606 (2001). There the Court held that the fact that a property owner purchased property after
passage of the regulation prompting the takings claim is not alone sufficient to avoid a takings
claim. Id at 626-30. The Court also held that the timing of acquisition could be considered as
part of the Penn-Central balancing test which includes the property owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations. Id What distinguishes the water situation from Palazzolo is
that the junior did not acquire his right from another private water rights holder. He acquired it
directly from the state. Where the post-regulation acquisition of title is from the state,
Palazzolds rejection of a perse rule may not hold.
227 See supra note 9 (discussing Professor Brian Gray's "hybrid drought" idea).
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Even if one continues to reject the idea of imposing the entire burden
on junior appropriators as a matter of fairness, that is not a persuasive
argument for the current system of joint and several liability without
contribution where agency discretion determines burden allocation. If
fairness to junior diverters is the concern, then, at the very least,
responsibility should be allocated in some proportional fashion. As an
example, if ten percent increased flow were necessary to meet the
regulatory burden, each user could be required to decrease her diversion by
ten percent.228 Indeed, some might argue that as a matter of economic
theory, this sort of proportional allocation might even be preferred over
allocation by priority. If the last increment of each diverter's water has
diminishing marginal utility, it would arguably be more efficient to
destabilize that marginal amount of water for every diverter rather than the
whole water right of a few juniors. That gain in efficiency, however, must be
balanced against the unfairness to senior diverters as well as the increased
costs of pursuing a remedy from all of the diverters.
It is for this latter reason that California, in public trust doctrine cases,
has refused to apportion trust responsibilities among multiple diverters.229 In
228 In an eastern riparian rights jurisdiction, that proportional allocation could also take the
form of a reasonable use inquiry, although a more quantitative division would be more efficient.
On reasonable use and riparian rights generally, see 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 7.01-7.02
(1991) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991). The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes reasonable use
allocation as follows:
The determination of the reasonableness of a use of water depends upon a consideration
of the interests of the riparian proprietor making the use, of any riparian proprietor.
harned by it and of society as a whole. Factors that affect the determination include the
following: [a] The purpose of the use, [b] the suitability of the use to the watercourse or
lake, [c] the economic value of the use, [d] the social value of the use, [el the extent and
anmount of the harm it causes, [f] the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the
use or method of use of one proprietor or the other, [g] the practicality of adjusting the
quantity of water used by each proprietor, [hi the protection of existing values of water
uses, land, investments and enterprises, and [i] the justice of requiring the user causing
the harm to bear the loss.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1977). In theory, if reasonable use principles were
applied, a court or agency would have broad discretion to accomplish equity while also working
to achieve the most efficient solution. Priority could be taken into consideration but so could
extent of harm and the social and economic value of various water uses. Unfortunately, it is
hard to be confident that this theory can be translated into practice. With all of the judicial and
agency discretion inherent in such a multi-factored balancing test, water users would be given
little, if any, additional certainty about their potential exposure than they currently have. See
generally I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra, § 9.01 (reviewing scholarship critical of
reasonable use decision making as "too unpredictable" and as continually "unstable because
what is reasonable will change with every significant change of circumstance").
229 Under the modem public trust doctrine first articulated in Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (finding that Illinois could revoke a prior grant to the Illinois Central
Railroad of approximately 1,000 acres of submerged lands adjacent to Chicago without paying
any compensation), a state is said to hold title to land under navigable water in trust for the
public and any grant of such lands may be revoked or limited without payment of just
compensation. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 228, § 30.02 (providing an
overview of the doctrine); James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal
Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 1-62 (1997) (discussing
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the famous Mono Lake case, 230 Los Angeles originally argued for an
apportioned approach, cross-complaining against 117 other individuals and
entities claiming water rights in the Mono Basin.23 1 Ultimately, however, the
trust obligation to restore Mono Lake was imposed only on Los Angeles.2 32
What was unstated in the Mono Lake case-that the public trust
responsibility could be allocated to the party against whom the complaint
was drawn-was stated explicitly by the State Water Resources Control
Board in Water Right Order 84-2.21 There, the Board specifically rejected an
argument that the public trust limitations could not be enforced against only
one diverter but "must be made simultaneously or not at all."2 34 Presumably,
the Board's concern was that obligating the state to pursue all water rights
before a trust resource could be protected imposed too great an
administrative burden. 235 But to the extent the Board was worried about
historical origins of the doctrine). Although originally limited to land under navigable waters,
and to the purposes of protecting navigation, commerce, and fishery, the doctrine has been
extended in some states, most prominently and aggressively California, to water rights obtained
by prior appropriation and to the broader purposes of protecting the public's interest in
recreational and environmental amenities loosely associated with navigable waters. See James
R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for Public Trust Takings, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 332, 379
(1998) (discussing this development). This expansive view of a trust doctrine that allows states
to revoke or limit water rights in the interest of protecting the public's interest in environmental
amenities begs the question of which water rights should be revoked or limited; in other words,
which diverters are interfering with the trust resources and which diverters should bear
responsibility for the interference.
230 California first extended the public trust doctrine to water rights in National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983), its well-known decision regarding the right of Los Angeles to withdraw water from the
tributaries of Mono Lake. Under the public trust doctrine of NationalAudubon Society the state
retains ongoing supervisory control over water rights and may alter existing appropriations to
protect public trust resources. Id at 727-28.
231 Id. at 716.
232 See In re Amendment of the City of Los Angeles' Water Right Licenses for Diversion of
Water from Streams Tributary to Mono Lake (Water Right Licenses 10191 and 10192,
Applications 8042 and 8043) City of Los Angeles, Licensee, Decision 1631, 1994 WL 758358, at
*1-2 (Cal. St. Water Res. Control Bd., Sept. 28, 1994). In its decision remanding the case to the
state board, the California Supreme Court had only suggested that "some responsible body
ought to reconsider the allocation of the waters of the Mono Basin." NatYlAudubon Soc, 658
P.2d at 729.
233 In re Matter of Water Right Permits in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Watershed
(Term 80 Pernits), 1984 WL 19050 (Cal. St. Water Res. Control Bd., Feb. 1, 1984).
234 Id at *14. The Board decided that "[n]othing in the Audubon decision requires the Board
to initiate proceedings to exercise jurisdiction over every possible water right on public trust
grounds." Id at *14. The State Board appears to have continued to take this approach. At least
partly in response to public trust claims, it has altered and restricted diversions of major
diverters in order to protect fisheries and water quality, without attempting to include all
diverters and without reference to priority of appropriation. See In the Matter of Complaints
Against Diversion and Use of Water By the California-American Water Company, 1995 WL
464902, Order 95-10, at *11 (Cal. St. Water Res. Control Bd., July 6, 1995) ("Cal-Am diversions,
standing alone, are not the sole cause of current conditions in the Carmel River ....
Nevertheless, Cal-Am's combined diversions from the Cannel River constitute the largest single
impact to the instrean beneficial uses of the river.").
235 Professor Weber makes this point, arguing that if public trust obligations had to be
shared among all diverters, it would have "required the equivalent of a streanwide adjudication
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administrative convenience and not about fairness among diverters, another
solution was available, namely allocating trust burdens by priority. Allowing
the trust obligation to be imposed on whomever the state chooses without
the targeted defendant having anything analogous to a right of contribution
makes no more sense in the public trust doctrine context than it does under
the ESA.
B. KfPth Amendment Implications
A second potential concern for some with determining causation or
allocation by reference to priority is that it might prove more costly to public
coffers by strengthening diverters' takings claims. If the regulatory burden is
assigned by priority, it is more likely that some appropriators would be
denied complete use of their water rights. This complete wipe-out would
create a stronger argument for a per se, or categorical, taking under the
Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.2 6 The
concern about an increase in total wipe-out takings claims is probably
exaggerated. As an initial matter, it is not clear that a total wipe-out is
necessary to fit water cases into a categorical takings category. In a recent
decision in the Court of Federal Claims, 3 a court held that the ESA worked
a physical taking when compliance with its terms merely reduced a
diverter's water right.21
Even if this physical taking rationale does not survive, it is not clear
that a total denial of water would amount to a per se taking. Consider again
the hybrid drought concept. If the regulatory drought is inseparable from the
natural drought, it would seem to remove the case from the total wipe-out
category (at least a portion of the water loss can be said to inhere in the
junior appropriator's property right) and require a balancing approach to the
takings question under Penn Central Transportation Company v. New
York 239 There is also some question about whether even a total wipe-out
would constitute a taking if the water were restored in a couple of years.
before any one diverter could be forced to bear trust-mandated water use changes." Gregory S.
Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text and Context, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1155, 1181
(1995).
236 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (holding that
where a regulation eliminates all economically viable use of property it will constitute a per se
taking unless the regulation was justified by background principles of common law that inhered
in the property right to begin with). See generally Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and
the Public Trust Doctine: Some Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423 (1995).
237 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States (Tidare Lake), 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001).
238 Id at 318-20. The Tulare Lake case has been strongly criticized. See Douglas T. Kendall,
et al., Conservative Judicial Activism and the Environment: An Assessment of the Threat, 32
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,835, 10,842 (2002); Deborah Curran, In Brief, Federal
Government Must Pay for Water to Protect Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 29
ECOLOGY L.Q. 421, 424-25 (2002).
239 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) (holding that to determine whether a regulation has worked a
taking a court must weigh the economic impact on the property owner, the interference with
distinct, investment-backed expectations, and the character of governmental action).
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Although at first glance such a temporary denial might appear to be a
temporary taking under the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles (frst English),24 the Supreme Court's
recent opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (Tahoe),241 which held that a thirty-two month moratorium
on development was not a taking,2 42 suggests that the Court may now be
leaning a different direction. Without delving into all the possible
arguments, 243 it is sufficient to note that in light of current takings law, it is
unclear that a complete denial of a junior's right to appropriate will be a
taking.
Even if allocating by priority were to result in stronger per se takings
claims, that should not be a criticism of the priority approach. Instead it is
an additional equitable benefit. One problem with the current regime is that
the entire regulatory burden falls on a single appropriator without respect to
priority. This inequity could be alleviated by proportional allocation which
would at least spread the burden among all water users. But for the reasons
described above, proportional allocation would remain inequitable to senior
rights and would increase administrative costs.2 4  By contrast, taking water
away from the junior-most appropriator(s) and then requiring the public to
compensate the junior(s) respects the reliance interests of senior
appropriators, captures the efficiency gains of honoring the priority system,
and equitably spreads the regulatory burden over the public, all of whom
benefit from the regulation. At bottom, avoiding per se takings claims is
simply an inadequate justification for inequitably and inefficiently targeting
senior rights holders.245 If fear of perse takings claims must be the operative
240 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
241 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
242 Id. at 332. The Court in Tahoe distinguished Flirst English on the grounds that it only
addressed the appropriate measure of compensation once a temporary regulatory taking had
been established and had not addressed the prior question of whether the regulation at issue
constituted a temporary taking. Id. at 328-29.
243 A variety of counentators have written about the application of takings law to water
rights. See generally Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine:
Some Realism About the Takings Issue, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 423 (1995); see Brian E. Gray, Takings
and Water Rights, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 23-1 (2002); Melinda Harm Benson, The 7dare
Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the Kifth Amuendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551
(2002). Although the courts' view would surely be a more reliable indicator of how takings law
applies to water rights, there simply is not much case law on the issue. Only one court has
specifically found a regulatory taking of a water right. See Tulare Lake, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
Cf Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 576-77 (1990)
(suggesting that Oklahoma's proposed switch from a riparian rights system to an appropriative
rights system could give rise to a takings claim under the Oklahoma Constitution because it
would deny existing riparians their vested interest in making prospective reasonable use of the
stream); Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002) (concluding that Hage had a property
interest in his water rights and that by canceling his grazing permit and then denying him access
to the associated state water rights and federal ditch rights, the federal government may have
taken his water rights).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 228-29 (discussing this inefficiency).
245 It would be naive to suggest that government officials do not, and should not, consider
the public costs associated with imposing burdens on different property owners. Consider, for
example, a state decision to condemn land for a public highway. The state could run the
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principle, it would at very least be better to adopt proportional allocation
than to use the current approach.
V. CAUSATION UNDER SECTION 7
Whereas FWS and NMFS have not been aggressive in using section 9 to
remedy river harms,24 6 they have been more willing to employ section 7, in
large part because its application avoids some of the knotty causation
questions that arise under section 9.247 Section 7 applies to a wide variety of
government conduct and thus has a large potential impact. Section 7(a)(2)
includes within its scope "any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency."248 Federal "action" is further defined by regulation to mean "all
activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in
whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high
seas."2 49 The number of water-related activities authorized, funded, or
carried out by federal agencies and thus subject to section 7 is broad and
continues to grow. Almost all significant dams in the West are licensed by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and must be
relicensed.250 There are also numerous federal water projects on western
rivers. As found in one 1996 study, "184 individual species with habitat
affected by federal Reclamation projects and water service areas [were]
highway through a poor section of town or a rich section of town. The condemnation costs will
be vastly different. The relevant question is whether the condemnation costs should be the
prime consideration of where to site the road. Although cost is not irrelevant, it should not
entirely trump other considerations. Fairness between the two sections of town, the costs of the
road itself, and the environmental impact of the road are also important considerations.
246 See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (discussing this reluctance). See also Eric
Biber, Conment, The Application of the Endangered Species Act to the Protection of
Freshwater Mussels: A Case Study, 32 ENVTL. L. 91, 121 (2002) (noting that "([interviews with
Service staff confirmed that section 9 has not been used at all with respect to actions by private
landowners on private lands abutting streams").
247 See supra notes 198-99 (discussing agency preference for section 7 over section 9). See
also infra Part V (discussing how the agencies' approach to section 7 has avoided causation
questions).
248 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
249 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). The regulation also gives some examples which include: "(a)
actions intended to conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of regulations;
(c) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-
aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air." Id.
250 See generally AMERICAN RIVERS, RIVER RENEWAL: RESTORING RIVERS THROUGH
HYDROPOWER DAM RELIGENSING, at
http://www.amrivers.org/hydropowertoolkit/riverrenewal'htm (last visited July 20, 2003) (noting
that in the next 15 years, 550 projects will need to be relicensed).
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either listed or proposed for listing under the ESA."251 Likewise any dredging
and filling requires a 404 permit from the Army Corps of Engineers." 2
In theory, the federal obligation to "insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of [a species's critical
habitat]"253 presents two causation issues: Whether an action will cause
jeopardy and whether it will cause adverse modification of critical habitat.
In practice, however, the wildlife agencies have treated the duty to avoid
adverse modification of critical habitat as encompassed by the duty not to
jeopardize or take protected species.25 With recent court decisions
251 Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish Versus
Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 320-21 (1996) (providing empirical analysis of
potential water allocation conflicts between endangered fish species and irrigated agriculture in
western river systems). The article further notes:
Reclamation is the largest supplier of irrigation water in the western United States,
regularly delivering more than 25 million acre feet (maf) per year to farms. This water
irrigates 9-10 million cropland acres, or roughly one-half of all surface-water irrigated
acres in the West. Reclamation-served agriculture relies on a vast network of water
storage and conveyance projects. Reclamation facilities include: 355 storage reservoirs,
254 diversion dams, 16,047 miles of canals, and 37,193 miles of laterals.
Id at 333.
252 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). See also Riverside Irrig.
Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985) (denying 404 nationwide permit for depositing
dredge and fill material for construction of dam because of adverse affect on the habitat of the
endangered whooping crane).
253 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2) (2000). To accomplish this objective, section 7 establishes a
consultation procedure that obligates the federal action agency (the agency that is authorizing,
funding, or carrying out the activity) to consult with the applicable wildlife agency, either FWS
or NMFS, on several issues. First, it must inquire whether any protected species is in the vicinity
of the proposed activity. See id. § 1536(a)(3), (c)(1). If one is present, the action agency must
then prepare a "biological assessment" to decide whether the activity "may affect" the protected
species. Id If a species may be affected, the wildlife agency must prepare a biological opinion to
determine whether the activity will take, jeopardize, or adversely modify the critical habitat of
the protected species. Id. § 1536(b). If jeopardy or adverse modification is found, the wildlife
agency must suggest "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to avoid jeopardy or adverse
modification. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A). Alternatively, if the activity will result in take but not jeopardy
or adverse modification, the wildlife agency shall issue an incidental take statement subject to
terms and conditions necessary to minimize the impact. Id. § 1536(b)(4). On the consultation
process, see generally Ruh], supra note 202, at 365-66.
254 See generally BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 81, at 253-59. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 402.02
(2002) (defining jeopardize as to engage in any action that could be "expected to reduce the
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species") with id. (defining adverse
modification as "alteration [of habitat] that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat
for both the survival and recovery of a listed species").
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condemning the agencies' approach to critical habitat,255 this may change,
but thus far the causation analysis has been the same.
FWS defines the phrase "jeopardize the continued existence of' to
mean engaging "in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or
indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction,
numbers, or distribution of that species.""5 6 In light of this definition,
jeopardy is at once easier and more difficult to prove than take. On the one
hand, because it is possible to take a limited number of individual animals
without appreciably jeopardizing the survival and recovery of the species,
proof that an action causes actual injury to a particular animal will not
necessarily be sufficient to prove jeopardy. On the other hand, because
jeopardy is a population-level analysis, the agency need not trace the
harmful effect of a particular action to a particular animal as is the case with
section 9. This avoids the problem of proving causation on a more probable
than not basis in cases of significant background mortality. In this regard,
consider anew the hypothetical posed above. 57 Assume that under current
habitat conditions the risk of owl predation is ten percent and a federally
permitted harvest will increase that risk to fifteen percent. In this situation it
is not possible to prove a section 9 take. With respect to any particular owl
within the project area, one cannot know on a more probable than not basis
that the harvest will proximately cause a take. If the harvest goes forward
and a dead owl shows up, the chances that the owl was harmed by the
harvest are only one in three. Under section 7, however, the analysis is
different. The test for jeopardy is whether the harvest will "reduce
appreciably the likelihood of... survival and recovery."" 5 If the increased
255 See Sierra Club v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 436 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding FWS's definition of adverse modification facially invalid because critical habitat is an
area essential to conservation and conservation of species indicates a broader duty than merely
ensuring their survival); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248
F.3d 1277, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2001) (also taking the view that critical habitat protection is not
coterminus with jeopardy protection).
256 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
258 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002). Of course, this "appreciably reduce" inquiry is still fraught with
biological uncertainty, which is one of the reasons that the wildlife agencies have been so
flexible (or, some might say, subject to political influence) in consulting with action agencies
and in the mitigation requirements they have imposed on those agencies. See, e.g., Mary
Christina Wood, Reclaining the Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species Act as Applied to
Endangered River Ecosystems, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 197, 252 (1998) ("If the Services' implementation
of the ESA in [the Columbia and Colorado] basins is consistent with the national pattern, the
broad scientific discretion afforded in the section 7 jeopardy mandate has invited considerable
political influence and has comproumised the purely scientific approach Congress mandated in
the Act itself."); Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the
US. Departments of Interior and Conunerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 319 (1993) (observing
"recurring evidence that-whatever the law-the (reasonable and prudent) alternatives found
for controversial projects have been strongly influenced by local and national politics").
Agencies are also able to be flexible because their decisions are given significant deference
upon judicial review. See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) ("[A]n
agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified
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risk to the owl population from the harvest is "appreciable," the harvest may
be enjoined or limited. Finally, to the extent "jeopardy" encompasses federal
action that may directly or indirectly inhibit the "recovery of a listed
species,"2 9 even proof that an activity will increase the risks of population
decline may not be necessary.
Another interesting facet of the agencies' approach to jeopardy is how it
largely avoids the joint causation issues that are problematic in the section 9
context. To assess whether an action will reduce the likelihood of survival
and recovery, FWS begins by analyzing the so-called environmental baseline:
The environmental baseline includes the past and present impacts of all
Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action area,
the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action area that
have already undergone formal or early section 7 consultation, and the impact
of State or private actions which are contemporaneous with the consultation in
process. 
260
In determining whether a proposed action is likely to result in jeopardy,
FWS also considers the. "cumulative effects" of the proposed action, meaning
"those effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal
activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area."261 In
essence, FWS treats contemporaneous and future state and private actions
as if they were past actions (i.e. part of the environmental baseline) for
purposes of causation. In this way, FWS simply avoids any difficult questions
about joint causation or allocation of responsibility among
contemporaneous habitat modifiers. The ability to avoid these questions
helps explain why FWS and NMFS have been quicker to use section 7 than
section 9.262
experts....").
259 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2002).
260 Id. (emphasis added). See generally SULLINS, supra note 154, at 68-69 (discussing
environmental baseline analysis). Using the environmental baseline has meant that the more
degraded the particular habitat or species, the more likely it is that any further degradation will
be said to cause jeopardy. Id
261 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphasis added). See also SULLINS, supra note 154, at 82-83.
"Cumulative effects" should be distinguished from "indirect" effects of a proposed action.
Indirect effects are those which "are caused by or result from the proposed agency action, are
later in time, and are reasonably certain to occur." U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE & NATIONAL
MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK 4-27 (1998).
262 Although the population focus and the environmental baseline approach have made
section 7 a more attractive tool to the wildlife agencies than the narrower take prohibition of
section 9, the agencies have still been cautious about clearly defining what actions cause
jeopardy. Just as under section 9, the agencies' approach, when they have acted, has been to
threaten prosecution and push for a habitat conservation plan and incidental take permit. The
agencies have tended to use a potential jeopardy finding under section 7 as leverage to
negotiate alternatives or modifications to the proposed activity, so as to avoid possible
jeopardy. See Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy Under the Endangered Species Act: Playing a Game
Protected Species Can't Win, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 114, 115 (2001) ("In their day to day
implementation of section 7, the Services seldom use the jeopardy standard to draw a clear
biological line in the sand; rather, the concept of jeopardy often amounts to little more than a
vague threat employed by FWS and NMFS to negotiate relatively minor modifications to federal
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Eschewing joint cause analysis and allocation questions for federal
action under section 7 has some merit. Congress intended federal agencies
to bear the brunt of species conservation responsibility under the ESA.
Recall that section 7(a)(1) requires federal agencies affirmatively to "carry[]
out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened
species."263 Likewise section 4(f) requires FWS and NMFS to develop
recovery plans "for the conservation and survival of endangered species and
threatened species."26 4 Although thus far section 7(a)(1)'s conservation duty
and the obligation to develop recovery plans have been largely dead
letters,2 6 these affirmative duties suggest Congress intended federal actors
to do more than simply avoid causing harm on their own. Federal agencies
were to make a bad situation better, or at very least, not to make a bad
situation any worse.
If avoiding joint cause questions through use of the environmental
baseline approach makes sense with respect to past or perhaps even
contemporaneous habitat modification, its application to future actions,
except those necessarily caused by the federal action, is dubious. It would
have been a stark departure from long-standing causation principles if
Congress had concluded that agency action could cause jeopardy even
though when the federal action was completed jeopardy would not have
been apparent. It also would be odd if Congress intended the jeopardy
determination to include future state and private actions when those actions
would be subject to section 9's prohibition on harmful habitat modification.
and non-federal actions.").
263 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2000). The conservation of protected species requires an agency
to "use... all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary." Id § 1532(3). These
methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all activities associated with
scientific resources management such as research, census, law enforcement, habitat
acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and transplantation, and, in the
extraordinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be
otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking.
Id.
264 Id. § 1533(f(1).
265 See Rohlf, supra note 262, at 117 ("To the chagrin of many environmental organizations,
the affirmative conservation mandates of section 7(a)(1) have historically exerted little
influence over the actions of federal agencies. FWS and NMFS have never issued regulations
interpreting or implementing these requirements, save for a provision in their joint consultation
regulations which authorizes these agencies to include a separate section in biological opinions
that provides federal action agencies with 'conservation recommendations.' However, this
regulatory provision explicitly emphasizes that such recommendations 'are advisory and are not
intended to carry any binding legal force."') (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.140) (2002)); Federico
Cheever, Recovery Planning, the Courts and tMe Endangered Species Act 16 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 106 (2001) (discussing limited role of recovery requirement and advocating renewed
focus on recovery); Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery. A New Way of Thinking About
the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1996) (making related argument); J.B. Ruhl,
Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the
Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107 (1995)
(discussing the potential and current understanding of section 7(a)(1) and section 4(f)).
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Whether Congress intended future actions to be included within the
environmental baseline is important to the water context because, as
explained above, under a system of prior appropriation, junior diversions
logically and legally occur in the "future." Where, for example, a Bureau of
Reclamation project with senior water rights is subject to relicensing, is it
fair to the Bureau, or to those private parties who contract with the Bureau
for water, to include in the environmental baseline the water diversions of
junior appropriators? Although the Bureau's potential affirmative
conservation obligations make this a more difficult case than with a private
diverter under section 9, on balance, when jeopardy depends upon stream
flow, a principled approach to causation under section 7 suggests that
appropriations junior in time to the federal project should not be considered
part of the environmental baseline.
Perhaps the most interesting point to take from this short analysis of
section 7 is that it may help explain the federal wildlife agencies' rather
confused approach to causation under section 9. One way of understanding
the agencies' imposition of joint and several responsibility without the
opportunity for contribution is as an application of the environmental
baseline approach. If an agency or conservation biologist assumes a baseline
that includes contemporaneous actions and then looks at harm, they do not
even see questions, necessitated by Sweet Homds proximate cause
requirement, about multiple habitat modifiers, joint causation and equitable
allocation. Likewise, to the extent the agencies understand harm as habitat
modification that increases population risks (the section 7 approach) rather
than as more probably than not causing harm to particular animals (the
section 9 approach), it may explain their seeming ignorance of the important
causation questions presented by background risk. Whereas section 9 and
Sweet Home require agencies to prove that habitat modification, in most
contexts, at least doubles (i.e. makes more probable than not) any
background risk to identified animals,266 no such requirement exists under
section 7. Finally, understanding how the population focus and the
environmental baseline approach of section 7 affect the analysis of
causation and allocation may clarify the regulated community's frustration
with agency over-reaching in the negotiation of habitat conservation plans." 7
Although the project proponent will want to emphasize fair allocation and
the agency's difficult proof on causation, the agency will likely be
unimpressed by such arguments because in deciding whether to authorize
an incidental take permit, it will be thinking in section 7 terms.2" Although
both inquiries are legitimate parts of an HCP negotiation, disentangling the
266 See supra Part II.D.3 (discussing why this is the case under section 9 except in those
circumstances where the habitat modification alters the entire habitat of the endangered
population).
267 See supra note 204 (discussing this concern).
268 Recall that agencies are obligated to ensure that any action they authorize "is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of [a species's critical] habitat." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(2000).
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two would clarify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the bargaining
positions.
VI. CONCLUSION
If agencies and courts tasked with enforcing the ESA desire to match
action to consequence and responsibility to blame, they will need to
consider another path from the one they have started down. Whether by
judicial elaboration of section 9 or by agency rulemaking, a different
approach to causation and allocation should be adopted. The proximate
causation inquiry under Sweet Home should account for background risks,
for multiple habitat modifiers and, in prior appropriation settings, for
priority. And once it is determined that harm is the proximate result of the
actions of multiple habitat modifiers, the agencies need to reconsider their
approach of allowing political dynamics and administrative expedience to
determine the target of the regulatory burden. Rather than taking the
discredited and rejected tort law approach of imposing joint and several
responsibility without any right of contribution, the agencies and courts
should move toward some equitable apportionment approach. Where
instream flow is the habitat issue, allocation by priority, on balance, seems
the wisest course, particularly given the ESA's explicit commitment to
cooperation with states on water resource issues.269 In other joint habitat
modification situations where individual contribution to the harm is
discernible, responsibility would best be allocated in proportion to those
individual contributions. Finally, to the extent the wildlife agencies are
concerned that either of these two approaches might be too great a burden,
they should at least consider some good faith obligation to join major habitat
modifiers or some form of contribution action. In the water context, that
contribution action could take the form of allowing targeted seniors to call
the river. Whatever the preferred approach, the time is ripe for federal
wildlife agencies and courts applying section 9 to reconsider their approach
to causation of wildlife harm and to allocation of responsibility among joint
habitat modifiers.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100 (discussing the federal obligation to
cooperate).
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